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Understanding Unconscionability: Defining the
Principle*
JEFFREY C. FORT**
INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of unconscionability is firmly entrenched in Anglo-
American contract law. However, since its inclusion in the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC or Code),' the doctrine has been the subject
of much controversy. Literally hundreds of law review articles, com-
ments and case notes have addressed it.' Much of this commentary
* The author would like to acknowledge the invaluable and irreplaceable guidance and
criticism furnished by the late Professor Robert Childres of the Northwestern University
School of Law in the preparation of this article. This article is a further articulation of some
of the views expressed by Professor Childres in his casebook on remedies, though the analysis
here differs in several respects. Compare R. CHRDRES & W. JOHNSON, JR., EQurrY, RESTrrUTmoN
AND DAMAGES 304-05 (2d ed. 1974).
** Associate, Martin, Craig, Chester & Sonnenschein. B.A., Monmouth College, 1972; J.D.
cum laude, Northwestern University, 1975; Law clerk to Justice M. Karns, Jr., Illinois Appel-
late Court, 1975-76.
1. U.C.C. § 2-302 provides:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract
to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce
the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the uncons-
cionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as
to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause
thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportun-
ity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the
court in making the determination.
An identical provision appears in the Seventh Tentative Draft of the Second Restatement of
Contracts § 234, and a similar statute is incorporated in California's laws, CAL. Civ. CODE §
3391 (Deering 1972), which perhaps explains the absence of § 2-302 from the California
version of the Commercial Code. And while Louisiana does not have an identical statutory
counterpart to § 2-302, its decisions are generally consistent with unconscionability decisions
in other states.
2. By 1967 over 130 essays had been published discussing unconscionability in one context
or another. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA.
L. REv. 485, 486 n. 3 (1967) [hereinafter cited as The Emperor's New Clause]. Since that
time, the number has perhaps doubled, in no small part because of Professor Leff's detailed
criticism of the section. Among the more exhaustive articles sparked by Professor Leff were:
Spanogle, Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 931 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as Spanogle]; Murray, Unconscionability: Unconscionability, 31 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Murray]; Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE
L. J. 757 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Ellinghaus]; Davenport, Unconscionability and the
Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U. MiAMI L. Rav. 121 (1967). More recent commentary dis-
misses unconscionability as being inadequate to meet certain needs, or considers it in a
narrow context. See, e.g., Slawson, Mass Contracts: Lawful Fraud in California, 48 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Lawful Fraud]; Sweet, The American Contract System:
Loyola University Law Journal
was triggered by the Code's provision that unconscionable contracts
or clauses were not to be enforced so as to cause an unconscionable
result: unconscionability was defined in terms of itself. Also criti-
cized were the Official Comments to the UCC which identify the
principle of unconscionability as intended to prevent oppression and
unfair surprise. These writers have attacked or defended the pres-
ence of the doctrine in the Code with considerable eloquence and
verve. Some condemned it for failing to have an identifiable mean-
ing, while others found that to be its greatest attribute.' But through
it all, no one has identified or defined unconscionability and some
have disclaimed or shunned any attempt to do so.
Refusing to undertake a definition of the doctrine does nothing to
refute the well-argued position that unconscionability in the Code
is amorphous and meaningless.5 Nor does it rebut the argument that
unconscionability is a "peripheral" remedy.6 For unconscionability
to be a useful analytical tool, it must be workable, and to be worka-
ble, it must be understood. Yet in understanding it, care must be
taken not to let one's frame of reference hide the meaning and
impact of the doctrine.
The objection to a definition of unconscionability apparently lies
in the belief that by defining the notion, it will become outmoded
and inapplicable to future abuses. This belief rests upon the as-
sumption that by defining a notion it becomes a rule, i.e., a legal
rubric which is either applicable or not in an all or nothing fashion
and which is not valid if not applied where the requisite facts are
established.7 An examination of the shortcomings of the doctrines
of fraud, misrepresentation and mistake over the past decades re-
veals that this fear is well founded. These grounds for justifying
avoidance of contract performance became complex rules; failure to
prove any one of the elements of the rules barred relief. The rules,
Today & 2001, 7 IND. L. REv. 309 (1973); Eddy, On The "Essential" Purposes of Limited
Remedies: The Metaphysics of UCC Section 2-719(2), 65 CAL. L. REv. 28 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Limited Remedies]. Other recent articles have endeavored to prescribe a perspective,
including a comparison to German law, and criticize the use of "substantive unconscion-
ability." See Dawson, Unconscionable Coercion: The German Version, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1041
(1976); Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J. LAW & ECON. 293 (1975).
3. Compare The Emperor's New Clause, supra note 2, with Spanogle, supra note 2.
4. E.g., Wille v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 219 Kan. 755, 549 P.2d 903 (1976); Note, The
Doctrine of Unconscionability, 19 MAINE L. REv. 81 (1967).
5. See The Emperor's New Clause, supra note 2.
6. See Lawful Fraud, supra note 2. Of course, whether unconscionability is peripheral may
depend in large part upon one's perspective. To one wishing to assure the enforceability of a
contract, satisfying unconscionability may perforce negate a more limited theory of avoidance
of performance.
7. See Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 14 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
Dworkin, Rules].
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however, failed to keep pace with commercial developments, leav-
ing much room for abuse. Printed, mass-produced forms replaced
handwritten, individually drafted documents, and merchants and
other contracting parties grew in size. As a result, those who did the
purchasing or selling had little authority or competence to bargain
over terms. The printed form replaced the traditional bargained
exchange of the parties, even as the parties' size and technical ex-
pertise made the risks and products more complex. The judges
responded with doctrines of constructive fraud or contract construc-
tion contra proferentum. But these developments merely com-
pounded the problem of complex contracts, and raised the com-
plaint that they were "tools . . . of misconstruction" and, hence,
unreliable.'
Most writers agree that the doctrine of unconscionability was
included in the Code to avoid these circuitous or indirect objections
to form contracts, along with other potential abuses of the bargain-
ing process. Whether it was a good idea to define unconscionability
in the words of section 2-302 was the subject of dispute.' Surely,
unconscionability decisions may be prompted by an emotional reac-
tion to an apparently unjustifiable, unequal exchange. This notion
appears to conflict with the policy of freedom of contract which
holds that persons should be able to allocate the burdens of the
exchange by agreement, including risks of loss. Some took the posi-
tion that if unconscionability could be invoked at any time to
change the prior allocation of the risks, havoc would result in the
commercial world; no one would be able to predict their financial
exposure, and litigation costs would rise sharply.
This argument might be valid if courts were motivated solely by
emotional and intellectual considerations, i.e., doing justice on an
ad hoc basis. In fact, however, courts appear to be no more and no
less concerned with doing justice where a claim of unconscionability
is made than in any other dispute. While an intellectual/emotional
component is undoubtedly present, the decisions nevertheless point
to a definition of the concept of unconscionability. This judicially-
developed definition is phrased in terms of what conduct a contract-
ing party can observe in attempting to assure that the written agree-
ment will not be declared unconscionable.'"
An examination of what courts and legislatures have indicated are
8. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARv. L. REv. 700, 703 (1939).
9. See generally the articles cited in note 2 supra.
10. These emotional factors cannot be read completely out of the equation. But an exami-
nation of the cases indicates that courts are not swayed by claims of hardship where the
complainant consciously and deliberately assumed certain risks as part of an exchange.
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unconscionable contracts or clauses indicates the limits of the no-
tion, and these limits suggest the definition of unconscionability.
The definition serves to rebut the charge that unconscionability is
an amorphous and peripheral remedy, and makes possible a predic-
tion of what may be held unconscionable and what probably will not
be, thereby facilitating commercial certainty. The doctrine is objec-
tive, despite the argument that the enforceability of a contract de-
pends upon the judge's "conscience" and experience.
Unconscionability is defined in this article as a principle. Princi-
ples are different from rules, such as the rules of fraud and mistake,
in that they are valid legal rubrics even though a court may not
apply them in all situations in which they may be applicable. 1
Defining unconscionability as a principle also provides some
perspective and facilitates analysis. If unconscionability is analyzed
only in terms of the rules of particular cases, the result would be a
most unwieldy list of relevant factors. 2 Finally, a moral and demo-
cratic result is achieved because defining unconscionability as a
principle rests upon basic contract tenets."
Unconscionability is a tool for the common law, a method of
analysis which puts contract law into a better perspective. The im-
portance of unconscionability does not lie in its ability to fill a
specific need. This is particularly true where a solution to a problem
does not rest upon the application of contract principles. The proper
forum is not the courts where goals and policies are the arguments
for or against a particular contract or clause."
11. Dworkin, Rules, supra note 7.
12. A striking illustration of what can happen if one resorts to an analysis based upon
"standards" of unconscionability appears in Willie v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 219 Kan.
755, 549 P.2d 903 (1976), where the court listed 10 such factors: (1) use of printed form, or
boilerplate, contracts drawn skillfully by the party in strongest economic position, which
establish industry-wide standards offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis; (2) significant cost-
price disparity or excessive price; (3) a denial of basic rights and remedies to a consumer
buyer; (4) inclusion of penalty clauses; (5) circumstances surrounding the execution of the
contract, its purpose, and actual effect; (6) hiding of clauses or inconspicous clauses; (7)
incomprehensible phrasing; (8) overall imbalance in obligation and rights created; (9) exploi-
tation of the underprivileged and illiterate; and (10) inequality of bargaining or economic
power. Id. at 758-59, 549 P.2d at 906-07. This type of unworkable analysis enforces the
conclusion that an explanation of unconscionability based on standards by which the enforce-
ability of a contract can be determined does not adequately define unconscionability. Thus,
the analysis and approach suggested here sharply differs from that of Professor Ellinghaus.
See Ellinghaus, supra note 2.
13. Cf., Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HA av. L. REv. 1057 (1975). Professor Dworkin argues
that where courts rely on principles to decide disputes, rather than on economic or political
considerations, democracy is best served.
14. Id. H6wever, the same general principle of contract unconscionability will be applied
before a legislative or administrative body to which these arguments may be properly ad-
dressed. Unconscionability is not limited to a particular group, but the expertise and func-
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The purpose of this article is to define and examine the doctrine
of unconscionability in modern contract law. Three propositions will
be advocated: (1) unconscionability is embodied in a principle
which permits forthright application without the sacrifice of flexi-
bility; (2) the principle represents part of a trend involving changes
in the rules of proof used to demonstrate the existence of an enforce-
able contract; and (3) notions akin to those prominent in tort law
in recent years appear in the principle, thus suggesting a basis for
the harmonization of tort and contract law in situations where both
can apply. While the primary thrust of this article is the establish-
ment of the first proposition, the latter two continually reappear.
This is not a critique of what ought to be, but hopefully it will
provide a perspective on what is being done by the lawmakers,
whether judicial, executive or legislative.
To understand unconscionability and identify the principle, what
has been ruled unconscionable must first be examined. From that
analysis, four criteria can be identified and a principle stated. The
article will then compare the theoretical underpinnings of the prin-
ciple and its consistency with other theories of contract and avoid-
ance of contract performance. Finally, the principle can be applied
to particular problems to better understand those questions and
issues, and rules which may be recognized in the years to come can
be predicted.
THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLE
The appropriate place to begin an elucidation of the doctrine of
unconscionability is with a review of what courts and legislatures
think is unconscionable. Although the boundaries of unconsciona-
bility cannot be articulated, 5 they are comprehensible through an
examination of various rules of law. Rules of unconscionability will
be examined by identifying situations in which courts or legislatures
have declared agreements unenforceable. Even though a particular
court or legislature may have difficulty in saying why it considers
tion of the decision-maker in applying the principles of unconscionability to a particular
transaction or class of transactions do determine to which governmental body decision-
making responsibility properly belongs. Perhaps those who have decried the ability of the
judiciary to protect adequately against abuses of the privilege of contract, including those
presented in unlitigated matters, and instead have advocated a legislative or administrative
remedy have come to the same conclusion but via a different route. See, e.g., Leff, Contract
as Thing, 19 AM. U.L. REV. 131 (1970); Kirby, Contract Law and the Form Lease: Can
Contract Law Provide the Answer?, 71 N.W.U.L. REV. 204 (1976).
15. One should distinguish between defining the boundaries of unconscionability, i.e.,
what kinds of circumstances per se will not be unconscionable, and defining the principle of
unconscionability which does not submit to an artificial limit upon the doctrine.
1978]
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something unconscionable," an analysis of the actions of those bod-
ies will define the doctrine.
In determining which judically declared rules are within the doc-
trine, it is necessary to formulate a preliminary definition of an
unconscionable contract or clause. The doctrine may be broadly
described in terms of contracts or clauses which courts refuse to
enforce because enforcement would abuse the judicial enforcement
mechanism as applied to consensual agreements. This broad defini-
tion encompasses transactions which do not meet one of the tradi-
tional grounds for avoidance of contract performance or enforce-
ment.'7 Unconscionability as herein defined thus includes: decisions
which explicitly hold a contract or clause unconscionable; cases
which suggest that strict enforcement of the contract would be un-
conscionable; and rules which declare a clause unenforceable as
against public policy.
Legislatures are a prolific source of rules relating to unconsciona-
bility. The legislatures, like the courts, are concerned with the con-
sumer's lack of alternatives and with his or her lack of understand-
ing of form contract terms. Statutes aimed at remedying abuses of
the bargaining process proscribe various contract clauses, and are
based upon the same concerns that motivate the courts. Many of
these statutory rules are patterned after judicial decisions. Other
statutes establish a standard of unconscionability.'5 In particular,
consumer protection statutes are founded upon the same considera-
tions and arguments as judicial rules of unconscionability.
The next section of this article discusses the rules of unconsciona-
bility, segregated into four criteria which comprise the basis of the
unconscionability principle. In many cases, an unconscionable con-
tract or clause was found because only one of the criteria was pres-
ent. In other situations the rule-making authority relied upon the
presence of more than one criteria in finding an unconscionable
contract or clause. Taken together, these criteria define the princi-
ple and identify terms which are not unconscionable.
16. This was candidly admitted by the court in Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d
189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1969), when it stated that "deciding the issue [of unconscion-
ability] is substantially easier than explaining it." Id. at 192, 298 N.Y.S. 2d at 266.
17. E.g., fraud, duress, mistake, lack of capacity and undue influence.
18. See United States Leasing Corp. v. Franklin Plaza Apts., Inc., 65 Misc. 2d 1082, 319
N.Y.S.2d 531 (Civil Ct. 1971), where a New York statute regulating retail installment con-
tracts and giving buyers an unconditional right to assert against an assignee all defenses they
had against the seller, was found to state a standard or a measure of unconscionability. Id.
at 1086, 319 N.Y.S. 2d at 534-35.
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Unfair Terms and Exchanges
Many different types of clauses and contracts, dealing with a
variety of transactions, have been subjected to an unconscionability
defense or attack.'" Indeed, insofar as a written document may de-
fine the parties' expectations of the burdens and risks of the transac-
tion, practically every term could conceivably be unconscionable.
However, a review of the rules indicates that only certain types of
contracts or clauses have been held unconscionable independently
of the bargaining process. In the great majority of situations, clear
reliance is placed upon the presence of procedural deficiencies, in
addition to substantive imbalance. The significance of the great
majority of cases coming within the latter type of analysis will be
demonstrated below. 0 The basis of the decisions finding substantive
exchanges unconscionable per se also is significant and clearly sug-
gests a definition of the principle. Hence, review of the rules relying
upon the terms of the exchange itself will be divided into these two
categories.
1. Exchanges Which are Unconscionable Per Se
Three identifiable classes of contract terms or terms of exchange
have been held unconscionable regardless of the bargaining which
may have taken place prior to the making of the contract. The first
two are unequal exchanges, and terms contrary to a forum's public
policy. These two form the basis for the more recently established
criterion, commercial unreasonableness.
a. Grossly Unequal Exchanges
The clearest example of the unconscionable per se contract is
those which are grossly unequal. They provide for the protection of
the form contract offeror at every opportunity and deprive the other
party of comparable protection. Courts will often say the contract
is "one-sided," or that the performance of the promisor is condi-
tioned upon "inadequate consideration." Under this rubric, a con-
tract is unconscionable if it drives too hard a bargain; for example,
the contract is unenforceable where the offeror has the sole right to
determine whether the delivered goods conform to the contract, and
the buyer can refuse tendered goods in certain situations, but the
19. Without providing an exhaustive list, it suffices to note that warranty disclaimers,
releases, exculpatory clauses, limitations of liability, liquidated damages terms, waiver of
defense clauses, cognovit notes and cross-collateral clauses have been held unconscionable,
and also enforced despite a claim of unconscionability.
20. See text accompanying notes 274-306 infra.
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seller must secure the buyer's permission before reselling, and the
contract provides for liquidated damages only if the seller
breaches.2'
In an agreement that the owner of land hold himself ready and
able to aid the excavators in their mining of coal from the property,
at the latters' unfettered option, it was found there was "not one
reciprocal feature" and hence the agreement was unconscionable.22
A similar objection was stated where a purchase-option in a lease
back agreement was attempted to be exercised. The court found
that the aggrieved operators could only lose since the harder they
worked to increase their business' value, the more likely it was that
the holder of the option would exercise it and oust them. 23 An em-
ployment contract providing that the employee had to give thirty
days notice of termination while the employer did not have to give
any notice was also held unconscionable. 2' An oppressively onerous
or one-sided contract may also be unconscionable if other substan-
tive factors appear.6
Other courts have implied that oppressive contracts are uncon-
scionable while finding the contract under consideration enforcea-
ble. 26 It has been held that the linking of short-term jobber supply
21. Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948). But see Campbell Soup Co.
v. Diehm, 111 F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Pa. 1952) where the same buyer's purchase agreement was
upheld. After the Wentz decision, the form had been revised to eliminate the liquidated
damages clause, provide for an objective standard for acceptability of the goods, and equal
or analogous rights were specified for delays or defaults. The Diehm court found that under
the revised contract the seller and buyer had equal rights, and rejected the seller's claim of
unconscionability.
22. Lear v. Chouteau, 23 Ill. 37 (1859).
23. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Doer, 123 N.J. Super. 530, 303 A.2d 898 (1973) (alter-
nate holding was that the plan clogged tle lessee's equitable right of redemption). See also
Pickerign v. Pasco Marketing, Inc., 303 Minn. 442, 228 N.W.2d 562 (1975).
24. India Tea Co. v. Petersen, 108 fl1. App. 16 (1903). But see Artman v. Internat'l
Harvester Co., 355 F. Supp. 482 (W.D. Pa. 1973). The Artman court rejected an unconsciona-
bility claim where there existed identical 30 day notice periods for termination, apparently
because it believed the notice period reasonable and hence proper under § 2-309 of the Code.
See also North Penn Oil & Tire Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 358 F. Supp. 908 (E.D. Pa.
1973) (90 day reciprocal notice terms not unconscionable).
25. In Central Ohio Co-op. Milk Producers, Inc. v. Rowland, 29 Ohio App. 2d 236, 281
N.E.2d 42 (1972), the court stated that to prove unconscionability (in a notice of termination
clause) one must show that (1) the terms are onerous, oppressive or one-sided and (2) that
the term bears no reasonable relation to the business risks. See text accompanying notes 189
to 217 infra. Similarly, the court in In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864 (E.D. Pa.
1966), held that even though the contract was onerous, oppressive or one-sided, it was not
unconscionable unless its provisions bore no relation to the business risks involved, a decision
which could be made only by examining the commercial setting of the contract.
26. E.g., R. L. Kimsey Cotton Co. v. Ferguson, 233 Ga. 962, 214 S.E.2d 360 (1975) (con-
tract price was fair when made and hence not unconscionable); Wade v. Austin, 524 S.W. 2d
79 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (no lack of reciprocity).
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contracts with long-term financing of supply facilities is not so one-
sided as to be unconscionable, because at the time of contracting
the supply contracts were advantageous to both." Similarly, a con-
tract which provided for no interest on accrued but undisbursed
royalties was upheld because of risks undertaken by the publisher
and the tax advantages to the author from the disbursement for-
mula."8 And a security provision providing that a debtor's payment
would be applied against items in the order purchased is not un-
conscionable."2
Another expression found in many decisions holding a contract
unconscionable solely on the basis of the substantive exchange is the
absence of adequate consideration to support the performance
sought by the form offeror. This was the rationale adopted by an
Indiana court in holding that an instrument of guaranty signed by
husband and wife when a note secured by a chattel mortgage was
executed, did not guarantee a loan for a much larger amount to the
husband individually. The agreement made each spouse the agent
of the other, waived any demand for payment of a subsequent loan,
provided for costs and attorneys' fees, waived the necessity for the
mortgagee to resort to legal remedies, and ratified all subsequent
acts of the other spouse. 30 The court found the guarantee ripe for
abuse and limited its application to the note with which it was
executed. The court stated that
where one party has taken advantage of another's necessities and
distress to obtain an unfair advantage over him, and the latter,
owing to his condition, has incumbered himself with heavy liabil-
ity or an onerous obligation for the sake of a small or inadequate
present gain, equity will relieve him.3'
Many other courts have invoked this concept in finding the pur-
chase price of an item was two or three times as great as the retail
price of comparable merchandise. 32 One court employed this notion
27. North Penn Oil & Tire Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 358 F. Supp. 908 (E.D. Pa.
1973).
28. In re Estate of Young, 367 N.Y.S.2d 717 (Surrogate's Court, 1975); Bill Stremmel
Motors, Inc. v. IDS Leasing Corp., 89 Nev. 414, 514 P.2d 654 (1973) (tax advantages to
complainant from lease mechanism, as opposed to purchase; hence deliberate choice made).
See text accompanying notes 189-217 infra.
29. Singer Co. v. Gardner, 65 N.J. 403, 323 A.2d 457 (1974).
30. Indianapolis Morris Plan Corp. v. Sparks, 132 Ind. App. 145, 172 N.E.2d 899 (1961).
31. Id. at 154, 172 N.E.2d at 903. It should be noted that this rule may not be proven
substantive in view of the court's reliance upon the necessities of the obligor in that case, a
factor perhaps related to the bargaining defect of lack of choice, to be discussed later.
32. Toker v. Westerman, 113 N.J. Super. 452, 274 A.2d 78 (1970); Central Budget Corp.
v. Sanchez, 53 Misc. 2d 620, 279 N.Y.S.2d 391 (1967) (dicta); cf. Star Credit Corp. v. Molina,
59 Misc. 2d 290, 298 N.Y.S. 2d 570 (1969) (failure of proof on this issue caused court to reject
1978]
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where it found that the purchasers had to pay a large price in ex-
change for goods and services of little or no value.3 While this latter
case has been criticized,3 the court's language suggests what other
courts probably meant. The lack of consideration necessary to sup-
port a contract is not the real reason for refusing enforcement. It
makes little sense to claim there is not enough "consideration" when
courts generally refuse to inquire whether the parties have made a
provident bargain, and when the court, though finding the "consid-
eration" inadequate, nevertheless does not void the entire transac-
tion. Rather, the contract should not be enforced because it is sim-
ply too unfair.35
Interest rates have also been found unconscionable or usurious.3
Interest has been found not collectable where it would not accrue
on an installment contract until after the security had been repos-
sessed, or until after foreclosure had been effected 7.3 The rationale
is that such interest is "unearned," and that to permit the creditor
to collect interest on money of which it has the use would amount
to a forfeiture or a penalty.Y
The law has disfavored the notion of forefeiture under a contract
because of its "harsh results.31 9 Contractual requirements in them-
selves harmless, but which if breached would trigger other clauses
unconscionability claim). In Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 279 A.2d 640 (1971), the court
ruled that a fixed contract price of two and one-half times the retail price rendered the
contracts at issue invalid. However, the action was brought by the New Jersey Attorney
General under a statute authorizing such actions where business practices in consumer goods
amounted to "deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, or the know-
ing, concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact with intent that others rely
upon such." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2 (West 1967). The court found the statute impliedly
authorized a suit to set aside unconscionable contracts. While the case was decided on the
substantive terms of the contracts in question, the statute seems directed as much at proce-
dural abuses, perhaps indicating that the contracts were not unenforceable merely because
of the substantive imbalance.
33. American Home Improvement, Inc. v. Maciver, 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886 (1964)
(alternate holding barred the seller from securing the balance due because of its failure to
comply with applicable disclosure statutes).
34. See, e.g., Murray, supra note 2.
35. But see Russell v. Park City Utah Corp., 548 P.2d 889 (Utah 1976), and Diamond
Housing Corp. v. Robinson, 257 A.2d 492 (D.C. 1969), which held, in essence, that a clause
permitting termination of one's lease rights was not unconscionable or unfair.
36. See, e.g., Dreyer v. Goldy, 62 Ill. App. 347, 353 (1896), appeal dismissed, 171 I1. 434,
49 N.E. 560 (1898).
37. See, e.g., Glacier Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Freeman, No. 70-1579 (D. Alas. 1970);
Block v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 286 A.2d 228 (D.C. 1972); Atlas Thrift Co. v. Horan, 27 Cal.
App. 3d 999, 104 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1972) (failure to resell in commercially reasonable manner
also cited as ground for refusing to permit collection of unaccrued interest as a deficiency).
38. Mann v. Earls, 226 Cal. App. 3d 155, 37 Cal. Rptr. 877 (1964).
39. See, e.g., Tilbert v. Eagle Lock Co., 116 Conn. 357, 165 A. 205 (1933); Psutka v.
Michigan Alkali Co., 274 Mich. 318, 264 N.W. 385 (1936); Mabley & Carew Co. v. Borden,
129 Ohio St. 375, 195 N.E. 697 (1935).
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giving the form offeror cumulative remedies, have been held unen-
forceable because the contract as a whole was "rooted in forfeiture,"
inflicted a penalty and was therefore unconscionable." ° Similarly,
unreasonable liquidated damage clauses were found to inflict a pen-
alty and to be unconscionable prior to the adoption of the UCC."'
Additionally, unreasonable time periods (which may lead to a forfei-
ture) are invalid under the Code. 2 And in a situation analogous to
a forfeiture, a contract clause designating a forum so inconvenient
as to deprive the other party of an opportunity to be heard has been
held unconscionable. 3
b. Public Policy
Many unconscionability decisions rest upon the public policy of
the jurisdiction, as reflected in its constitution, statutes and preced-
ent. Public policy considerations may carry great weight either in
finding a contract unconscionable or in finding that it should be
enforced. For example, the "previous balance" method of comput-
ing finance charges was held not unconscionable where it was found
to be within the contemplation of a consumer protection statute."
Failure to comply with applicable procedures may bar collection
of the full amount otherwise due on the contract." The offeror could
be barred from securing a judgment for the contract price if the
contract fails to comply with disclosure provisions." Other statutes
have been relied upon as stating a "standard of unconscionability"
40. See, e.g., Fairfield Lease Corp. v. Prat, 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 537, 278 A.2d 154, 156 (1971);
Fairfield Lease Corp. v. Umberto, 7 U.C.C. Rep. 1181 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1970). See also Weigman
v. Tomaselli, 81 Misc. 2d 328, 365 N.Y.S.2d 681 (County Ct. 1975).
41. See, e.g., Marshall Milling Co. v. Rosenbluth, 231 Ill. App. 325 (1924); Denkin v.
Steiner, 10 Pa. D. & C. 2d 203 (York County, 1956).
42. Wilson Trading Corp. v. Davis Ferguson Ltd., 23 N.Y. 2d 398, 244 N.E.2d 685, 297
N.Y.S.2d 108 (1968) (concurring opinion, Fuld, C.J.).
43. Paragon Homes, Inc. v. Carter, 4 U.C.C. Rep. 1144 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1968). This case
could also reflect the public policy considerations underlying the doctrine of forum non
conveniens. See also Tai Kien Indus. Co., Ltd. v. M/V Hamburg, 528 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1976).
But see Paragon Homes, Inc. v. Langlois, 4 U.C.C. Rep. 16 (Sup. Ct. 1967) and Paragon
Homes of Midwest, Inc. v. Crace, 4 U.C.C. Rep. 19 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967), holding that the
New York court would not exercise jurisdiction given them by a contract identical to the one
involved in Carter, under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, because the parties in those
cases were New York residents.
44. Johnson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 14 ill. App. 3d 838, 303 N.E.2d 627 (1973) (the
statute involved was the Illinois Retail Installment Sales Act, ILL;. REv. STAT. ch. 121, §§ 201
et seq. (1976)). Accord, Zachary v. R.H. Macy & Co., Inc., 66 Misc. 2d 974, 323 N.Y.S.2d
757 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
45. E.g., Mann v. Earls, 226 Cal. App. 3d 155, 37 Cal. Rptr 877 (1964). See also U.C.C.
§ 9-504; Dean v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 114 N.J. Super. 132, 275 A.2d 154 (N.J. App.
1971).
46. American Home Improvement, Inc. v. Maclver, 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886 (1964).
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by which parallel situations could be analyzed, such as a statute
prohibiting a waiver of defense clause,47 and one imposing various
restrictions48 in specific types of transactions. One court relied upon
the lack of a statutory presumption of unconscionability for limita-
tion of liability clauses in the context of commercial property dam-
age transactions to conclude that such are not unconscionable.49
Others have held that disclaimers of implied warranties are not
unconscionable because these clauses are permitted by the Code. 0
One court has even commented that a limitation of liability clause
was not unconscionable because there was no statutory public pol-
icy against mislabeling in a telephone directory advertisement.5'
Waiver of defense clauses have been subjected to a great deal of
analysis in determining whether they are unconscionable or against
public policy.52 This type of clause has been described as giving an
unprotected party the same status as a holder in due course; as
being against the spirit of a statute permitting an obligor to assert
any defenses against the assignee which it may have against the
assignor; and as failing to protect conditional vendees against impo-
sition by vendors in installment sales contracts. 3 These cases may
also cite a general public policy favoring protection of the con-
sumer.54 Other courts have refused to follow this analysis, particu-
larly where the state has no public policy prohibiting contractual
holder in due course status, or another policy against such a clause. 5
A similar pattern appears with respect to the issue of whether a
franchise contract can be terminated only for good cause. Where a
statute requires good cause before termination of the franchise, the
policy has been judicially applied to transactions not within the
47. United States Leasing Corp. v. Franklin Plaza Apts., Inc., 65 Misc. 2d 1082, 319
N.Y.S.2d 531 (Civil Ct. 1971).
48. Singer Co. v. Gardner, 121 N.J. Super. 261, 296 A.2d 562 (Dist. Ct. 1972), rev'd, 65
N.J. 403, 323 A.2d 457 (1974) (court found that there had not been an attempt to evade the
statutory requirements).
49. Gates Rubber Co. v. USM Corp., 351 F. Supp. 329 (S.D. Ill. 1972), rev'd on other
grounds, 508 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1975).
50. See, e.g., Marshall v. Murray Oldsmobile Co., 207 Va. 972, 154 S.E.2d 140 (1967);
Avery v. Aladdin Products Div., 128 Ga. App. 266, 196 S.E.2d 357 (1973). But see generally
text accompanying note 308 infra.
51. The Gas House, Inc. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 298 N.C. 175, 221 S.E.2d 499
(1976).
52. See generally Quality Fin. Co. v. Hurley, 337 Mass. 150, 148 N.E.2d 385 (1958).
53. Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967).
54. Fairfield Credit Corp. v. Donnelly, 158 Conn. 543, 264 A.2d 547 (1969).
55. See, e.g., Holt v. First Nat'l Bank, 297 Minn. 457, 214 N.W. 2d 698 (Minn. 1973);
Personal Fin. Co. v. Meredith, 39 Ill. App. 3d 695, 350 N.E.2d 781 (1976). The latter decision
rested in part on the allowance of such clauses in the U.C.C. § 9-206(1) and specific authoriza-
tion for such clauses in consumer transactions via the Illinois Retail Installment Sales Act,
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121-1/2, § 517 (1975).
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letter of the statute." But in the absence of such a statutory require-
ment, other courts have refused to impose it.57
Other expressions of public policy derive from precedent and his-
torical notions defining the public interest. For example, considera-
tions of public policy inhere in restraints upon attorney-client con-
tracts, including fee agreements.58 Restraint on a former employee's
place of subsequent employment is unconscionable when combined
with a contrary statutory policy and oppressive, unreasonable
terms.5"
A court may refuse to enforce an exculpatory agreement where the
benefited party is under (1) a public duty entailing the exercise of
care; and (2) there is a public interest in not enforcing those
clauses. 0 An example of this is a case where a hospital attempted
to avoid any responsibility for the negligence of its staff.' Similarly,
a contract was found unconscionable where it would have effectively
eliminated any responsibility for defects in a contractor's work, de-
spite its pre-contract advertisements and representations to the
contrary.2 The same result obtains where a clause would exculpate
56. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 63 N.J. 402, 307 A.2d 598 (1973), aff'g, 120 N.J.
Super. 357, 294 A.2d 253 (Bergen County 1972), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 920 (1974); Texaco,
Inc. v. Appleget, 63 N.J. 411, 307 A.2d 603 (1973). Contra Marinello v. Shell Oil Co., 368 F.
Supp. 1401 (D.N.J. 1974), rev'd, 511 F.2d 853 (3d Cir. 1975).
57. See, e.g., Russell v. Shell Oil Co., 382 F. Supp. 395 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Goldinger v.
Boron Oil Co., 375 F. Supp. 400 (W.D. Pa. 1974); North Penn Oil & Tire Co. v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 371 F. Supp. 676 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Texaco v. A.A. Gold, Inc., 78 Misc.2d 1050,
357 N.Y.S.2d 951 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 358 N.Y.S.2d 973 (App. Div. 1974). But in Mobil Oil Corp.
v. Rubenfeld, 72 Misc. 2d 392, 339 N.Y.S.2d 623 (Civil Ct. 1972), aff'd, 77 Misc. 2d 962, 357
N.Y.S.2d 589 (App. Term 1974), the court held that a franchise relationship carried with it a
duty to act in good faith and not to force the dealer into an anti-trust violation.
58. Baron v. Sarlot, 47 Cal. App. 3d 304, 120 Cal. Rptr 675 (1975). The court described
such a transaction as not a case of "two ordinary individuals entering into an agreement or
bargain governed by principles applicable to horse traders." Id. at 309, 120 Cal. Rptr at 678.
59. Triple D & E, Inc. v. Van Buren, 72 Misc. 2d 569, 339 N.Y.S.2d 821 (Sup. Ct. 1972),
aff'd, 346 N.Y.S.2d 737 (App. Div. 1973). See also Weidman v. Tomaselli, 81 Misc. 2d 328,
365 N.Y.S. 2d 681 (County Ct. 1975).
60. See, e.g., Hy-Grade Oil Co. v. New Jersey Bank, 138 N.J. Super. 112, 117-18, 350 A.2d
279, 281 (App. 1975). But the court also found the parties may still negotiate the standard
by which a bank's responsibility is to be measured. Further, a bank may enforce a printed
waiver of one's right to a jury trial on a signature card, David v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust
Co., 59 Misc. 2d 248, 298 N.Y.S.2d 847 (App. Term 1969), and avoid liability for loss of cash
from a safe deposit box by prohibiting the deposit of money in the box. Radelman v. Manufac-
turers Hanover Trust Co., 61 Misc. 2d 669, 306 N.Y.S.2d 638 (App. Term 1969).
61. Tunkl v. Regents of University, 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr 33 (1963).
While this case also involved a clear lack of choice, the court indicated that the public interest
in the agreement was sufficient to override the clause.
62. Nosse v. Vulcan Basement Waterproofing, Inc., 35 Ohio Misc. 1, 299 N.E.2d 708
(Municipal Ct. 1973). See also Electronics Corp. v. Lear Jet Corp., 55 Misc. 2d 1066, 286
N.Y.S.2d 711 (Sup. Ct. 1967) (possibly unconscionable because of extraordinary limitation
of warranties). Nosse might also be analyzed as one involving ignorance of the product
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one for his own gross negligence. 3
c. Commercial Unreasonableness
The adoption of the UCC emphasized the contract law policy of
encouraging good faith and commercial reasonableness. Several
courts have focused upon these as a standard for defining an uncons-
cionable contract or clause. 4 While Professor Lefft5 raised legitimate
questions as to what kinds of clauses were not commercially reason-
able, that notion as used here will indicate that the clause in ques-
tion bears no material relationship to the risks involved in the trans-
action.6" This definition continues the development of the previous
concepts of gross unfairness and public policy. If the policy of the
Code and the courts is to discourage "sharp dealings", 7 then terms
which are not reasonably related to the risks of the form offeror are
contrary to that public policy.
Decisions turning solely on this substantive issue generally have
found the challenged terms not unconscionable. For example, a con-
tract limiting the buyer's remedy for non-performance to return of
the buyer's deposit was upheld because the limitation was reasona-
ble.68 A contract which required a non-American corporation to give
a first lien on a ship where the entire purchase price was the amount
of the loan was also held enforceable as being neither oppressive nor
unreasonable. 9
The foregoing decisions suggest that the terms of exchange, or
that the substantive terms of the contract standing alone, are a
predominant aspect of the principle of unconscionability. However,
because of the homeowner's lack of knowledge of the risk assumed or as involving ignorance
of the contract because of the pre-contract representations and lack of bargaining.
63. Watsontown Brick Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 265 F. Supp. 268 (M.D. Pa.), aff'd
per curiam, 387 F.2d 99 (3d Cir. 1967). While the opinion is cast in terms of public policy,
another analysis would be that the clause was not enforced because the owner was ignorant
of the risk: he did not expect the demolition company to use an allegedly inexperienced and
incompetent employee for the job. See note 96 infra and accompanying text. This is a risk
completely within the contractor's control, and hence is a likely target for abuse. See also
note 288 infra, and accompanying text, and Limited Remedies, supra note 2, at 52-56.
64. See cases cited in notes 68-69 infra.
65. The Emperor's New Clause, supra note 2, at 544-46.
66. See In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
67. Bekkevold v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 216 N.W. 790 (1927).
68. See, e.g., Dow Corning Corp. v. Capitol Aviation, Inc., 411 F. 2d 622 (7th Cir. 1969);
Gas House, Inc. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 298 N.C. 175, 221 S.E.2d 499 (1976)
(commercial loss); see Cyclops Corp. v. Home Ins. Co., 389 F. Supp. 476 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
See also Lowe v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co., 54 Cal. App. 3d 718, 127 Cal. Rptr 23
(1976) (a retention of "standby deposit" held not unconscionable because it was not unreason-
able).
69. R.C. Craig Ltd. v. Ships of Sea, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 1066 (S.D. Ga. 1972). Accord,
Chewning v. Brand, 230 Ga. 255, 196 S.E.2d 399 (1973).
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the contrary is indicated by a review of other decisions involving
analagous transactions and an analysis of the status of the aggrieved
persons in the above cases. Courts and legislatures, rarely declare
that a transaction is unconscionable regardless of the bargaining
process or lack thereof. The only clauses which are per se uncons-
cionable are those which involve a penalty (including an unreasona-
ble liquidated damages clause) or which involve a "slave" con-
tract,70 and exchanges which affront a public interest. However, as
opinions and practices change, other abuses will undoubtedly be-
come evident and other notions of public policy will be fashioned.
2. Potentially Unconscionable Exchanges
a. Unfair Terms
While the foregoing list of rules may seem formidable, other
courts have relied upon the presence of an unfair exchange or com-
mercially unreasonable term (discussed above) in addition to other
factors relating to the bargaining process or the parties' notice of
defects in the subject matter. A large proportion of the rules pre-
viously considered are paralleled by other rules of unconscionability
which indicate that substantive imbalance is not enough.7' The
rules which include bargaining and/or status far outnumber the per
se rules. Thus, several courts have held that an excessive price is not
enough in itself to constitute an unconscionable contract.72 The
presence of deficiencies in the bargaining process have also been
relied on, along with the unfairness of the price, to hold a clause
unconscionable.73 Other rules do not specifically refer to any bar-
70. A "slave" contract is like the ones condemned in Lear v. Chauteau, 23 I1. 37 (1859),
and Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Doer, 123 N.J. Super. 530, 303 A.2d 898 (1973): the form
offeror could profit from the transaction no matter what happened, the entire risk or burden
being on the aggrieved party. Those situations are analogous to a requirement/output con-
tract for which special implied duties have been established. U.C.C. § 2-306. Section 2-306
essentially provides for reciprocal benefits-the imposition of a duty of reasonableness and
good faith on the person who has the exclusive-rights benefit.
71. E.g., Pickerign v. Pasco Marketing, Inc., 303 Minn. 442, 228 N.W.2d 562 (1975); see
Sinkoff Beverage Co. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 51 Misc. 2d 446, 273 N.Y.S.2d 364 (Sup.
Ct. 1966).
72. See, e.g., Contract Buyers League v. F & F Investment, 300 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Ill.
1969); Slaughter v. Jefferson Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 361 F. Supp. 590 (D.D.C. 1973); Morris
v. Capitol Furniture & Appliance Co., 280 A.2d 775 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971); Patterson v.
Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 277 A.2d 111 (D.C. 1971); Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52
Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966), rev'd on other grounds & aff'd, 54 Misc. 2d
119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (App. Div. 1967); Toker v. Perl, 103 N.J. Super. 500, 247 A.2d 701
(Super. Ct. 1968); Central Budget Corp. v. Sanchez, 53 Misc. 2d 620, 279 N.Y.S.2d 391 (Civil
Ct. 1967); Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (1969); see Star
Credit Corp. v. Molina, 59 Misc. 2d 290, 298 N.Y.S.2d 570 (Civil Ct. 1969).
73. Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 50 N.J. 528, 236 A.2d 843 (1967); In re Estate of
Vought, 70 Misc. 2d 781, 334 N.Y.S.2d 720 (Surrogate Court 1972), aff'd, 360 N.Y.S.2d 199
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gaining deficiencies, but because these rules are limited to consumer
transactions, there is undoubtedly a presumption that bargaining
over contract terms is absent." Examination of the cases holding
excessive price in itself unconscionable reveals that these decisions
involved persons of apparent disparate status and bargaining abil-
ity.7 5 The same conclusion can be drawn from decisions involving
the rubric of a one-sided or grossly unfair contract. 6
Cases concerning clauses challenged as being commercially un-
reasonable have also considered the bargaining process. Courts have
found terms which are unreasonably favorable to the form offeror"
and which bear no rational relationship to the risks of the transac-
tion 8 to be unconscionable when a lack of meaningful choice is also
present. 9 Similarly, decisions which reject a commercially unrea-
sonable challenge have noted the bargaining abilities of the parties,
but find that a meaningful choice was made by the aggrieved
party.80 Others have rejected such a challenge where there is no
evidence of a lack of real choice,' or have required proof of uncon-
(App. Term, 1974); Nu Dimensions Figure Salons v. Becerra, 73 Misc. 2d 140, 340 N.Y.S.2d
268 (Civ. Ct. 1973) (dicta). See also In re Marriage of Hines, 525 P.2d 517 (Colo. App. 1974)
(divorce property settlement where parties represented by counsel is not unconscionable).
74. See generally the UNIFORM CONsUMER CRErr CODE. See also 16 C.F.R. § 433 (1977)
(preservation of consumers' claims and defenses under authority of the Federal Trade Com-
mission).
75. See cases cited in note 32 supra dealing with purchases of consumer goods.
76. Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948) (food processor and farmer);
Indianapolis Morris Plan Corp. v. Sparks, 132 Ind. App. 145, 172 N.E.2d 899 (1961) (lender
and consumer).
77. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
Patterson v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 277 A.2d 111 (D.C. 1971); Seabrook v. Commuter
Housing Co., Inc., 72 Misc. 2d 6, 338 N.Y.S.2d 67 (Civ. Ct. 1972), aff'd on other grounds, 79
Misc. 2d 168, 363 N.Y.S.2d 566 (App. Term 1973).
78. See, e.g., Educational Beneficial, Inc. v. Reynolds, 324 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Civ. Ct. 1971).
But see Truck Rent-a-Center, Inc. v. Puritan Farms 2d, Inc., 41 N.Y.2d 420, 393 N.Y.S.2d
365, 361 N.E.2d 1015 (1977), where the court upheld a liquidated damages clause because it
bore reasonable relation to the risks of the transaction, i.e., the probable actual harm of a
breach by the lessee. The court also noted the contract had been negotiated in other respects
and that there appeared no disparity in bargaining power. Id. at 427, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 370,
361 N.E.2d at 1019.
79. Just what constitutes a lack of meaningful choice will be considered more fully below.
See text accompanying notes 188-217 infra. For present purposes, this concept should be
understood as occurring where the offeree of a form contract does not have the ability or does
not have the opportunity to negotiate the terms of the agreement. But see M/S Bremen v.
Zapata Off-shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
80. See, e.g., Geldermann & Co. v. Lane Processing, Inc., 527 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1975);
Dow Corning Corp. v. Capitol Aviation, Inc., 411 F.2d 622 (7th Cir. 1969); County Asphalt,
Inc. v. Lewis Welding & Eng'r Corp., 323 F. Supp. 1300 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 444 F.2d 372
(2d Cir. 1971); Gaskin v. Stumm Handel GmbH, 390 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); King v.
South Jersey Nat'l Bank, 66 N.J. 161, 330 A.2d 1 (1974); Barnes v. Helfenbein, 548 P.2d 1014
(Okla. 1976).
81. See, e.g., Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Distillers Co. Ltd., 395 F. Supp. 221
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scionability in the "commercial setting" of the contract."2
Even where public policy is applied by the courts, deficiencies in
the bargaining process are frequently relied upon in discussing the
unconscionable nature of a contract or clause. For example, dispar-
ity in bargaining positions in addition to a state's public policy has
resulted in a warranty disclaimer being declared unjust, inequita-
ble, and unenf orceable. s3 Another court held that a contract may
relieve one of liability for the consequences of his own negligent acts
if he can show that the terms do not contravene public policy and
that the contract clearly and unequivocally "spell[s] out the intent
to grant such immunity and relief from liability." 4 Additionally, a
peison under a "public duty" may not contract away his obligation
to exercise care where there is unequal bargaining power.85 However,
some courts have rejected a claim of unconscionability based upon
the public interest where a knowledgeable waiver was found. 6
It should not be surprising that considerations other than the
substantive terms of the agreement are important in finding a term
unconscionable. It is difficult to assess whether an exchange is fair, 7
and perhaps even dangerous or counter-productive. 8 Courts have
not abandoned the notion of freedom of contract 9 and a contract
can be declared unconscionable only if this is the conclusion reached
within the context of the appropriate commercial setting.9" Com-
mercial setting is an ambiguous standard,9 but clearly it does in-
clude considerations of the industry's customs and needs. The latter
appear to relate to the reasonableness of a specific term and the
former to the aggrieved party's constructive knowledge of the term
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); W.L. May Co., Inc. v. Philco-Ford Corp., 273 Or. 701, 543 P.2d 283 (1975).
82. E.g., Fredonia Broadcasting Corp., Inc., v. RCA Corp., 481 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1973);
Haugen v. Ford Motor Co., 219 N.W.2d 462 (N.D. 1974).
83. Steele v. J.I. Case Co., 197 Kan. 554, 419 P.2d 902 (1966).
84. Dilks v. Flohr Chevrolet, 411 Pa. 425, 436, 192 A. 2d 682, 688 (1963). Accord, Sutter
v. St. Clair Motors, Inc., 44 Ill. App. 2d 318, 194 N.E.2d 674 (1963).
85. Hy-Grade Oil Co. v. New Jersey Bank, 138 N.J. Super. 112, 350 A.2d 279 (App. 1975).
As will be discussed later, unequal bargaining power is one of the situations where there exists
no meaningful choice for the disadvantaged person. See text accompanying notes 264-273
infra.
86. See, e.g, Hicks v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co., 512 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1975);
Hewitt v. Miller, 11 Wash. App. 72, 521 P.2d 244 (1974); see K & C, Inc. v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 437 Pa. 303, 263 A.2d 390 (1970).
87. See Schwartz, Seller Unequal Bargaining Power and the Judicial Process, 49 IND. L.J.
367 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Schwartz].
88. See Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J. LAW & ECON. 293 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Epstein].
89. See Dewey, Freedom of Contract: Is It Still Relevant?, 31 OHIo ST. L.J. 724 (1970).
90. See note 1 supra.
91. See The Emperor's New Clause, supra note 2, at 541-46.
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and the risk transferred by that term. These concepts are related to
the purposes of the bargaining process.
b. Commercially Reasonable Terms
Many terms which are commonly used may also be held uncons-
cionable. Included in this category of reasonable risk-shifting terms
which can become the subject of abuse are contract provisions such
as limitation of remedy, exculpatory, indemnification, waiver of
defense and confession of judgment clauses.2 While use of several
of these terms in a single contract may cause the agreement to be
one-sided and unconscionable for that reason,93 most disputes in-
volving these terms are not based upon lopsided transactions. In-
stead, the usual involves a term which, if enforced, would alter the
usual damages rules for the particular transaction. These terms may
be unconscionable where the aggrieved party did not intelligently,
knowingly and voluntarily agree to them. In the extreme case, such
terms might be unconscionable only because to enforce them would
be unfair.94
It thus appears that few unconscionability decisions rest upon the
substantive terms of an exchange. The most frequent disputes in-
volve other components of the. principle: ignorance of the risk; igno-
rance of the contract; and lack of choice.
Ignorance of the Risk
If parties to an agreement are to transfer intelligently the risks of
the exchange they must know what it is they are receiving or promis-
ing. An intelligent transfer is impossible if the parties do not appre-
ciate the significance of a defect or even know of its existence. A
similar difficulty arises if the contract is unintelligible or impre-
cise. Although both classes of events could be described as instances
where the aggrieved party was ignorant of the risks, only the former
are so defined here.15 The latter are more properly considered as
factors indicating the parties' ignorance of the contract-i.e., the
92. E.g., Architectural Cabinets, Inc. v. Gaster, 291 A.2d 298 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971);
Personal Fin. Co. v. Meredith, 39 Ill. App. 3d 695, 350 N.E.2d 781 (1976) (dicta).
93. See cases cited in note 63 supra.
94. Such a case has not been reported, and it seems that in view of the courts' deference
to intelligent, knowing and voluntary risk allocation, that unfairness alone would not over-
come the parties' agreement, absent an adverse effect on the public generally.
95. On an extremely general level, it might be noted that mutual mistake cases have
involved the former group while unilateral mistake cases involve the latter. Those cases deal
with mistakes made in the course of preparing a contract; for example, the misplaced decimal
cases. There seems to be no real reason why an unilateral mistake concerning the inherent
risks of the product or thing exchanged could not occur, which is precisely what is being done
via the principle of unconscionability.
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terms of the exchange-and will be dealt with below.
The classic example of ignorance of the risk is the case excusing
non-performance where a mutual mistake was found as to the things
exchanged." Where goods are sold, the same situation may occur if
there is a hidden defect in the goods. 7 As an Illinois court expressed
it:
The complexities of today's machines are far too subtle to allow a
lay purchaser to deal at arm's length with a skilled merchant...
It would be unconscionable to say that he must have the skill
necessary to know that he must reject a new car or other machine
tendered for sale.98
Furthermore, this basis of unconscionability is closely related to
considerations suporting the requirement that merchants be subject
to implied warranties.9 It is also related to considerations of public
policy, and to the historic judicial remedy of mutual mistake. But
while ignorance of the risk is closely related to these notions of
public policy,1°0 it is more properly perceived as a separate basis of
the principle of unconscionability. Where a person cannot negotiate
for better protection than the disclaimer of liability contained in a
form contract, considerations of ignorance of the risk and lack of
choice require that the contract be held unconscionable.' 0'
96. E.g., Jackson v. Seymour, 193 Va. 735, 71 S.E.2d 181 (1952).
97. If the seller knew of the defect but did not disclose it, there could perhaps be an action
for fraud or misrepresentation. As a practical matter, however, courts frequently apply the
notion of a mutual mistake even when it is clear that the party seeking to enforce the contract
knew of the risk or burden involved and imposed upon the other party. Id. Five of the ten
cases cited in the Code Comments to § 2-302 as representative of results which would be
required under that section can be characterized as involving product defects of which the
buyer was reasonably ignorant: Kansas City Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Weber Packing Corp.,
93 Utah 414, 73 P.2d 1272 (1937); Meyer v. Packard Cleveland Motor Co., 106 Ohio 328, 140
N.E. 118 (1922); Bekkevold v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 216 N.W. 790 (1927); F.C. Austin Co. v.
J. H. Tillman Co., 104 Or. 541; 209 P. 131 (1922), Hardy v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.,
38 Ga. App. 463, 144 S.E. 327 (1928).
98. Sutter v. St. Clair Motors, Inc., 44 Ill. App. 2d 318, 194 N.E.2d 674 (1963). See also
Ford Motor Co. v. Pittman, 227 So.2d 246 (Fla. App. 1969), where the court did not determine
the question of "whether the disclaimer of the implied warranty on an expensive, compli-
cated, dangerous instrumentality capable of effecting human injury or death and designed
to be purchased and used by persons lacking knowledge in mechanics is an unconscionable
provision in a contract for sale." Id. at 249-50.
99. See Bekkevold v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 216 N.W. 790 (1927).
100. E.g., Dessert Seed Co. v. Drew Farmers Supply Inc., 248 Ark. 858, 454 S.W.2d 307
(1970) (unequal ability to minimize or foresee the occurrence of the risk). See also notes 64
supra, and 107, 217.1, infra and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., Sarfati v. M.A. Hittner & Sons, Inc., 35 A.D. 2d 1004, 318 N.Y.S.2d 352
(1970), aff'd, 30 N.Y.2d 613, 331 N.Y.S.2d 40, 282 N.E.2d 126 (1972); Ford Motor Co. v. Tritt,
244 Ark. 883, 890A, 430 S.W.2d 778 (1968). While Sarfati also indicates a reliance upon a lack
of choice, the appellate division relied on Wilson Trading Corp. v. David Ferguson, Ltd., 23
N.Y.2d 398, 297 N.Y.S.2d 108, 244 N.E.2d 685 (1968), which is clearly a case involving an
Loyola University Law Journal
Contract terms may be unconscionable where they transfer the
risk of latent defects, or defects which are not reasonably discovera-
ble upon tender of the goods.'0 2 The most frequently stricken clauses
are those which limit the time within which the purchaser must
reject the goods or make a claim of imperfect tender. 103 Other deci-
sions hold limitation of remedy clauses invalid because the remedy
provided is illusory.0 4 The problem with the latter clauses is that
they purport to provide a remedy, but it proves ineffective because
of an unknown defect. 05 Similarly, other courts have found terms
unconscionable which would have protected a seller against a claim
that the goods were non-conforming where that fact could not rea-
sonably have been discovered within the time allowed.0 6 Further, if
the performance of a service contract is not "conforming" to the
other party's reasonable expectations of the manner in which the
contract should be performed, an exculpatory clause benefitting the
actor may be unconscionable. 7
ignorance of the risk situation. Further, the general narrowness with which courts apply the
lack of choice basis of unconscionability, see text accompanying notes 189-217 infra, would
indicate that Sarfati is an ignorance of the risk case.
102. Ford Motor Co. v. Tritt, 244 Ark. 883, 430 S.W.2d 778 (1968); Neville Chem. Co. v.
Union Carbide Corp., 294 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Pa. 1968); Hardy v. General Motors Acceptance
Corp., 38 Ga. App. 463, 144 S.E. 327 (1928).
103. Kansas City Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Weber Packing Corp., 93 Utah 414, 73 P.2d
1272 (1937); Wood, Stubbs & Co. v. Kaufmann, 233 Ill. App. 138 (1924); Wilson Trading
Corp. v. David Ferguson, Ltd., 23 N.Y.2d 398, 297 N.Y.S.2d 108, 244 N.E.2d 685 (1968)
(dicta); Velez v. Craine & Clarke Lumber Corp., 41 App. Div. 2d 747, 341 N.Y.S.2d 248 (1973)
(dissenting opinion).
104. E.g., Wilson Trading Corp. v. David Ferguson, Ltd., 23 N.Y.2d 398, 297 N.Y.S.2d
108, 244 N.E.2d 685 (1968); Adams v. J.I. Case Co., 125 111. App. 2d 388, 261 N.E.2d 1 (1970).
See generally Limited Remedies, supra note 2. Professor Eddy examines the proper mode of
analysis for clauses challenged as failing their essential purpose under § 2-719(2). The failure
of essential purpose rule in § 2-719(2) is closely related to unconscionability and in a sense is
a rule of unconscionability. But see id. at 77 n.177. Professor Eddy argues that clauses
challenged as failing their essential purpose should be analyzed using a three-step approach:
(1) whether the risk is actually allocated by the challenged term; (2) if so, what is the proper
interpretation and application of that term; and (3) if applied to the loss at hand, whether
that would produce an unconscionable result, i.e. whether the clause is enforceable. The
essential purpose doctrine is an analytical process used to separate those terms which should
and should not be scrutinized by unconscionability, and, at the same time, a specialized form
of a broader doctrine of unconscionability. See id. at 83, 89, 91.
105. E.g., Eckstein v. Cummins, 41 Ohio App. 2d 1, 321 N.E. 2d 897 (1974).
106. See, e.g., Meyer v. Packard Cleveland Motor Co., 106 Ohio 328, 140 N.E. 118 (1922);
F.C. Austin Co. v. J.H. Tillman Co., 104 Or. 541, 209 P. 131 (1922); Bowen v. Young, 507
S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); Mobile Housing, Inc. v. Stone, 490 S.W.2d 611 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1973); see Jefferson Credit Corp. v. Marcano, 60 Misc. 2d 138, 302 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Civ.
Ct. 1969). See also Overland Bond & Inv. Corp. v. Howard, 9 Ill. App. 3d 348, 292 N.E.2d
168 (1972); Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 (1968) where
the courts held there was a timely revocation of acceptance under § 2-609 of the Code, despite
the presence of a term indicating acceptance of the auto by the buyer.
107. See Watsontown Brick Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 265 F. Supp. 268 (M.D. Pa.),
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Terms disclaiming implied warranties and limiting the other's
remedy are unconscionable if they would preclude the buyer from
having a meaningful remedy solely because he could not precisely
specify, despite repeated efforts, the defective part whose replace-
ment would remedy the defect."" "It cannot be presumed that a
buyer will voluntarily and knowingly agree to pay a full and ade-
quate consideration for a pseudo-obligation."'10 But where the ag-
grieved party knew of the defect in the product, a risk-shifting term
is not unconscionable on the basis of ignorance of the risk.'"" The
status of the aggrieved party may also be relied upon to indicate
that he knew and appreciated the risk of the transaction."'
Where the parties bargained over the contract terms and were
knowledgeable as to the risks involved,"2 disclaimers have been en-
forced. Conversely, if the term was not bargained for, it may be
unconscionable even if the parties were aware of it." ' Other courts
disagree, refusing to hold unconscionable a clause protecting a seller
for a loss due to a latent defect where there was negotiation as to
some of the contract terms,"' or reasonable notice of the exculpatory
clause.' 5
Ignorance of the Contract
Most of the rules of unconscionability rest in part upon the ag-
grieved party's ignorance of the terms of the written instrument.
Many of these rules are express; others make an implicit assump-
tion of lack of knowledge. The most obvious example of the latter
variety is consumer protection laws. Sometimes this assumption of
lack of knowledge is limited to the lack of compliance with type-size
and warning requirements for consumer contracts.
aff'd per curiam, 387 F.2d 99 (3d Cir. 1967); see also Lazan v. Huntington Townhouse, Inc.,
69 Misc. 2d 1017, 332 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Dist. Ct. 1969), aff'd, 330 N.Y.S.2d 751 (1972) (per
curiam); Robinson v. Jefferson Credit Corp., 4 U.C.C. Rep. 15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967).
108. Eckstein v. Cummins, 41 Ohio App. 2d 1, 321 N.E.2d 897 (1974).
109. Id. at 12, 321 N.E.2d at 904.
110. See Robinson v. Branch Moving & Storage Co., 28 N.C. App. 244, 221 S.E.2d 81
(1976); Harison-Gulley Chevrolet, Inc. v. Carr, 134 Ga. App. 449, 214 S.E.2d 712 (1975).
111. Kleven v. Geigy Agricultural Chem., 303 Minn. 320, 227 N.W. 2d 566 (1975); see J.D.
Pavlak, Ltd. v. William Davies Co., 40 Ill. App. 3d 1, 351 N.E.2d 243 (1976).
112. Cyrogenic Equip., Inc. v. Southern Nitrogen, Inc., 490 F.2d 696 (8th Cir. 1974);
Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Olvera, 119 F.2d 584 (9th Cir.
1941); see J.D. Pavlak, Ltd. v. William Davies Co., 40 Ill. App. 3d 1, 351 N.E.2d 243 (1976).
113. Dobias v. Western Farmers Assoc., 6 Wash. App. 194, 491 P.2d 1346 (1971).
114. Southwest Forest Indus., Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 422 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir.
1970); Hiigel v. General Motors Corp., 34 Colo. App. 61, 544 P.2d 983 (1976).
115. E.g., Winant v. Approved Ladder & Equip. Corp., 31 App. Div. 2d 965, 298 N.Y.S.2d
796 (1969), affd, 28 N.Y.2d 529, 319 N.Y.S.2d 72, 267 N.E.2d 885 (1971) (mem. dec.).
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Congress' reliance on this bargaining deficiency '6 is demonstrated
in the legislative findings and declaration to the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act."7 The Illinois Consumer Fraud Act"' evinces a simi-
lar concern. The purpose behind the Illinois Act's requirement of
notice in ten-point type to consumer buyers who execute a negotia-
ble instrument"9 has been described as designed
to increase the likelihood that the consumer debtor would be ap-
prised of his rights, or lack thereof, which he had as a result of
executing a negotiable instrument. Assuming that this notice
would enable the consumer to comprehend his contractual obliga-
tions, he would not be unfairly surprised when he later discovered
that the entity to whom the installment payments had to be made
was immune from his defense or claim regarding the purchased
goods.'12
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code,'2 ' California's Unruh Act,'22
and New York's Personal Property Law' 2 1 contain similar no-
tice/warning requirements for consumer transactions. These provi-
sions apparently are intended to increase the likelihood that a con-
sumer will have knowledge of the terms of his or her purchase.
Conversely, without the required notice, it is conclusively presumed
that the consumer is unaware of the effect of the contract and the
particular clause to which the notice relates is unenforceable.
The UCC embodies the same notion. Section 2-302 provides for
the non-enforceability of terms altering the usual damages rules of
implied warranties when set forth in fine print.'2 4 Apparently imple-
menting that principle, section 2-316(2) requires that clauses be
conspicuous where they disclaim the implied warranties of mer-
chantability and fitness for a particular purpose.' 25 That is, they
must be "so written that a reasonable person against whom [the
disclaimer] is to operate ought to have noticed it.' ' 2 1 Where the
disclaimer is not conspicuous, it may nevertheless be enforced if the
116. H.R. REP. No. 93-1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 7702.
117. 15 U.S.C. § 2301-12 (1975).
118. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 ,12, §§ 261 et seq. (1975).
119. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, § 262D (1975).
120. Personal Fin. Co. v. Meredith, 39 Il. App. 3d 695, 698, 350 N.E.2d 781, 786 (1976).
121. E.g., IND. CODE ANN., § 24-4.5-2-404(1) (Burns 1974) (U.C.C.C. § 2-404).
122. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1804.1, 1804.2 (Deering 1977 Supp.).
123. NEW YORK PERS. PROP. LAW § 403 (McKinney 1976 Supp.).
124. New Prague Flouring Mill Co. v. Spears, 194 Iowa 417, 189 N.W. 815 (1922), is cited
by the Code Comments as an illustration of the results required by § 2-302.
125. Sections 2-314, 2-315, respectively of the Code.
126. U.C..C. § 1-201(10).
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party against whom it operates had knowledge of it.'
Of course, the courts have repeatedly emphasized the aggrieved
party's ignorance, or lack of demonstrated ignorance, in ruling on
claims of unconscionability. While there is a variety of circumstan-
ces in which unconscionability claims have been sustained, objec-
tive proof is generally required.' The complainant's status is often
persuasive corroboration of that parol evidence.'29
Several types of situations fall under this concept of ignorance of
the contract. Three of these were cited by the court in Wille v.
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.: ' inconspicuous clauses; incom-
prehensible phrasing; and exploitation of the underprivileged and
illiterate. Other courts have relied upon proof of one or more of these
circumstances, along with other facts, to find ignorance of the con-
tract. '3 However, it is possible to identify several more precise cate-
gories.
One of the most obvious situations in which the aggrieved party
is justifiably ignorant of the contract is found in cases suggesting
fraud, overreaching or misrepresentation. 3 This may arise where
the aggrieved party enters into a contract as the result of high pres-
sure sales tactics. Where those techniques preclude an understand-
ing of the obligations transferred or assumed, the contract terms are
unconscionable. 3  The existence of such "bargaining" may similarly
be an element in a decision holding a clause unenforceable. 34 These
situations are not unique to consumer transactions and may cause
invalidation of terms in business deals as well. "Agreements" were
127. Smith v. Sharpensteen, 521 P.2d 394 (Okla. 1974). Contra, Fairchild Indus. v. Mari-
time Air Serv., Ltd., 274 Md. 181, 333 A.2d 313 (1975).
128. The relationship between unconscionability and the objective theory of contracts is
discussed at text accompanying notes 308-314 infra.
129. See generally Childres & Spitz, Status in the Law of Contract, 47 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1
(1972).
130. 219 Kan. 755, 549 P.2d 903 (1976).
131. E.g., Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972), affg 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970)
(reliance upon survey which showed ignorance of the effect of printed contracts, particularly
within a given income and level of education group). See also Star Fin. Corp. v. McGee, 27
Ill. App. 3d 421, 326 N.E.2d 518 (1975).
132. See, e.g., Toker v. Perl, 103 N.J. Super. 500, 247 A. 701 (Super Ct. 1968), aff'd, 108
N.J. Super. 129, 260 A.2d 244 (App. Div. 1970); W. J. Grant Co. v. Walsh, 100 N.J. Super.
50, 241 A.2d 46 (Dist. Ct. 1968); see Tai Kien Indus. Co., Ltd. v. MA' Hamburg, 528 F.2d
835 (9th Cir. 1976).
133. Nu Dimensions Figure Salons v. Becerra, 73 Misc. 2d 140, 340 N.Y.S.2d 268 (Civ.
Ct. 1973).
134. See, e:g., Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct.
1966); Albert Merrill School v. Godoy, 78 Misc. 2d 647, 357 N.Y.S.2d 378 (Civ. Ct. 1974);
Western Discount Corp. v. Pliego, 5 Clearinghouse Rev. 30 (#719743, Wash. Super. Ct. Kings
County 1971); Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. Jimeniz, 82 Misc. 2d 948, 371 N.Y.S,2d 289 (Civ.
Ct. 1975).
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held unenforceable where a disclaimer could not be observed prior
to execution of the contract'35 and where a bank representative
asked for and secured a contractor's signature to a commitment
under circumstances indicating that the contractor had no aware-
ness of the obligations contained therein.' '3
The sophistication of the aggrieved party is significant in deter-
mining whether the sales pitch actually prevented or obscured his
knowledge of the contract. Difficulties with the English language
make a buyer more susceptible to misleading and deceptive sales
techniques, and may result in the contract being held unconsciona-
ble.' 37 In this situation the buyer also might not understand the
terms of the transaction, causing the agreement to be unconsciona-
ble if literally enforced.13 Even if the complainant can speak Eng-
lish, the contract may be incomprehensible due to lack of sophisti-
cation. While one court has ruled that limited education alone is not
enough to base a finding of an unconscionable contract,' 3 others rely
heavily upon that fact. One with only a ninth grade education may
not be able to understand a lease-franchise agreement which con-
tains exculpatory and indemnification clauses."10 Similarly, an at-
torney may be held to a referral-bonus contract in connection with
a consumer goods purchase while substantially less sophisticated
persons have been excused."' More complex agreements may be
beyond the capacity of particular individuals and hence uncon-
scionable.' As one court stated, "courts must provide the neces-
sary instrumentality to pierce the shield of caveat emptor when it
is sought to be used as a sword at the throats of the poor and the
illiterate. ' " 3
135. Hunt v. Perkins Mach. Co., 353 Mass. 535, 226 N.E.2d 228 (1967).
136. Bank of Marion v. Robert "Chick" Fritz, Inc., 9 Ill. App. 3d 102, 291 N.E.2d 836
(1973), aff'd, 57 I1. 2d 120, 311 N.E.2d 138 (1974).
137. Jefferson Cred. Co. v. Marcano, 60 Misc. 2d 138, 302 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Civ. Ct. 1969);
Albert Merrill School v. Godoy, 78 Misc. 2d 647, 357 N.Y.S.2d 378 (Civ. Ct. 1974). But
compare Hernandez v. SIC Finance Co., 79 N.M. 673, 448 P.2d 474 (1968).
138. Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966);
Irazarry v. Metropolitan School of Law Enforcement, 5 Clearinghouse Rev. 405 (Ill. Cir. Cook
County #70-CH-1281, 1970).
139. Contract Buyers League v. F & F Inv., 300 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (class action).
140. Weaver v. American Oil Co., 257 Ind. 458, 276 N.E.2d 144 (1971). Compare K & C,
Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 437 Pa. 303, 263 A.2d 390 (1970).
141. Compare Neal v. Lacob, 31 Ill. App. 3d 137, 334 N.E.2d 435 (1975), with Frostifresh
Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966).
142. E.g., Urdang v. Muse, 114 N.J. Super. 372, 276 A.2d 397 (Dist. Ct. 1971); see Hen-
ningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); Seabrook v. Commuter
Housing Co., Inc., 72 Misc. 2d 6, 338 N.Y.S.2d 67 (Civ. Ct. 1972). But s~e Washington v.
Claassen, 218 Kan. 577, 545 P.2d 387 (1976).
143. Star Credit Corp. v. Ingram, 71 Misc. 2d 787, 789, 337 N.Y.S.2d 245, 248 (Civ. Ct.
1972).
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A person's expectations as to the meaning of a contract consists
of what he has understood from the terms of the written instrument
along with any negotiations or discussions. A contract or clause
which in effect is contrary to those reasonable expectations may be
unconscionable. Hence, a real estate broker's form contract was
held unconscionable as being contrary to the seller's reasonable ex-
pectations where it guaranteed the broker a commission even if no
sale were made, regardless of whether the lack of a sale was the
seller's fault. 4 ' The court held that the seller should be liable for a
brokerage commission only if a sale were made, unless the sale was
defeated because of the seller's improper and frustrating conduct.
The court thus effectively rewrote the contract to reflect the reason-
able expectations of the aggrieved party.4 5 Conversely, a stock re-
purchase agreement was held not unconscionable where it did not
frustrate the reasonable expectations of the complainant at the time
of contracting. 146
The parties' expectations may also rest upon the perceived bar-
gain, sometimes called the "basis of the bargain." Clauses which
would nullify the basic bargained exchange and where the disadvan-
taged party is not expected to have negotiated for more favorable
terms have been held unconscionable. Displaying a model of the
product to be purchased may constitute the "dickered" terms of the
deal, so that even a conspicuous disclaimer and limitation of liabil-
ity clause will not shield the seller where the delivered goods do not
conform to the model. "7 Similarly, where the specifications of the
product were bargained, a court refused to enforce a disclaimer in a
consumer contract which would have "eviscerated" that which the
buyer had bargained for.'48 Other courts have required that a war-
ranty disclaimer be specifically negotiated,'49 or that the parties
have in fact intended to indemnify a manufacturer for its own active
negligence. 5 " A clause which provided insurance coverage for bur-
glary only if there were "visible marks" on the building's exterior
was held unconscionable, in part because the clause altered the fair
meaning of an insurance contract. 5' Nor is a disclaimer or limita-
144. Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 50 N.J. 528, 236 A.2d 843 (1967).
145. See U.C.C. § 2-302(1).
146. Yeng Sue Chow v. Levi Strauss & Co., 49 Cal. App. 3d 315, 122 Cal. Rptr 816 (1975).
147. See, e.g., Bowen v. Young, 507 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); Mobile Housing,
Inc. v. Stone, 490 S.W.2d 611 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
148. Berg v. Stromme, 79 Wash. 2d 184, 484 P.2d 380 (1971).
149. See, e.g., Dorman v. Internat'l Harvestor Co., 46 Cal. App. 3d 11, 120 Cal. Rptr 516
(1975).
150. See, e.g., Vancouver Plywood Co. v. National Auto. Cas. Ins. Co., 387 F. Supp. 311
(W.D. La. 1975).
151. C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975).
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tion binding where it is not disclosed to the purchaser until delivery
of the goods; it is not part of the parties' agreement as to the terms
of the exchange.'52 But where the court believes that because of the
status and sophistication of the aggrieved he should have negotiated
a disclaimer or limitation of remedy clause, the agreement will be
enforced.'53
Similarly, warranty disclaimers and other risk-shifting clauses
are unenforceable if they are not conspicuous.'54 Thus, terms in fine
print may be unenforceable where they contain "conditions, stipu-
lations, reservations, exceptions and waivers" which restrict or
eliminate a seller's liability.'55 Also unconscionable is a cognovit
note placed in a commercial contract in a deceptive manner.5 ' And
a term in an insurance contract which is contrary to the insured's
reasonable expectations as to the coverage of the policy may be
152. See, e.g., Admiral Oasis Hotel Corp. v. Home Gas Indus., Inc., 68 Ill. App. 2d 297,
306, 216 N.E.2d 282, 286 (1965); Gozales v. Southwest Mobile Homes, Inc., 309 So. 2d 780
(La. App. 1975); see Tropicana Pools, Inc. v. Boysen, 296 So. 2d 104 (Fla. App. 1974); cf.
Rehurek v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 262 So. 2d 452 (Fla. App. 1972). Several courts have also
held these clauses unenforceable because they were not part of the "basis of the parties
bargain." See Chemco Indus. Applicators Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 F. Supp.
278 (E.D. Mo. 1973) (applying Arkansas law); Dessert Seed Co., Inc. v. Drew Farmers Supply,
Inc., 248 Ark. 858, 454 S.W.2d 307 (1970); Geo. C. Christopher & Son, Inc. v. Kansas Paint
& Color Co., Inc., 215 Kan. 185, 523 P.2d 709 (1974); Tiger Motor Co. v. McMurtry, 284 Ala.
283, 224 So. 2d 638 (1969); W & W Livestock Enterprises, Inc. v. Dennler, 179 N.W.2d 484
(Iowa 1970) (disclaimers had no effect upon oral warranties); cf., Karczewski v. Ford Motor
Co., 382 F. Supp. 1346 (N.D. Ind. 1974); Chrysler Corp. v. Wilson Plumbing Co., Inc., 132
Ga. App. 435, 208 S.E.2d 321 (1974); Ford Motor Co. v. Taylor, 60 Tenn. App. 271, 446
S.W.2d 521 (1969). But see Smith v. Sharpensteen, 521 P.2d 394 (Okla. 1974); Mosesian v.
Bagdasarian, 260 Cal. App. 2d 361, 67 Cal. Rptr 369 (1968); Boyd v. Thompson-Hayward
Chem. Co., 450 S.W.2d 937 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970); Beauchamp v. Wilson, 21 Ariz. App. 14,
515 P.2d 41 (1973). In County Asphalt, Inc. v. Lewis Welding & Eng. Corp., 323 F. Supp.
1300 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 444 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1971), the court noted that one of the
grounds justifying a claim of an unconscionable contract was where the aggrieved party was
misled as to the nature of the bargain. Id. at 1308. If disclaimers which were not part of the
parties' bargain were considered part of the contract (e.g., a disclaimer which first appeared
when the goods were delivered), then the County Asphalt rationale would view the aggrieved
party as misled as to the nature of the deal. These disclaimers would be held unconscionable
and unenforceable, just as the basis of the bargain rationale does, as in the Rehurek case.
153. See, e.g., United States Fibres, Inc. v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 449
(E.D. Mich. 1972), aff'd, 509 F.2d 1043 (6th Cir. 1975); Gaskin v. Stumm Handel GmbH,
390 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 238 Cal. App.
2d 95, 47 Cal. Rptr 518 (1965). Cf. Collins II v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 164 Conn. 369, 374,
321 A.2d 444, 448 (1973) (parties bound by plain language of the contract).
154. "Conspicuous" means the party against whom the clause operates should have no-
ticed it. U.C.C. § 1-201(10).
155. New Prague Flouring Mill Co. v. Spears, 194 Iowa 417, 189 N.W. 815 (1922). Accord,
Baker v. City of Seattle, 79 Wash. 2d 198, 484 P.2d 405 (1971). See also Ford Motor Co. v.
Pittman, 227 So. 2d 246 (Fla. App. 1969).
156. Architectural Cabinets, Inc. v. Gaster, 291 A.2d 298 (Super. Ct. 1971). See also
AAACON Auto Transport, Inc., v. Newman, 77 Misc. 2d 1069, 356 N.Y.S.2d 171 (S.Ct. 1974)
(forum selection clause "lost in a solid wall of type").
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unenforceable if in fine print.'57 Even if the form contains a conspic-
uous notice or disclaimer, it may still be unenforceable if the disad-
vantaged party could not see it before signing the form,' 8 or because
half the page, including the disclaimer, was underlined.'59 Thus,
many courts have required warranty disclaimers and limitation of
liability clauses to be brought to the attention and knowledge of the
purchaser before the contract is signed.'° But if a complainant had
"reasonable notice" of a disclaimer, that clause may be enforced.'"'
The requirement of conspicuousness has appeared in other uncon-
scionability decisions in the context of rules requiring a disclaimer
or other exculpatory term to be clear and specific. A notice which
did not "clearly and unequivocally" disclaim a film manufacturer's
liability for its negligence is unenforceable.' 2 Another court has held
that exculpatory terms are unenforceable unless they clearly and
unequivocally spell out the intent to grant such immunity and relief
from liability.' 3 An agreement may be unenforceable where it does
not constitute an express transfer and assumption of risk by the
injured party,' 4 though less specificity may be sufficient in a com-
mercial transaction.' 5 In a consumer transaction, a warranty can be
157. C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975).
158. Hunt v. Perkins Mach. Co., 353 Mass. 535, 226 N.E. 2d 228 (1967).
159. Jones v. Abriani, 350 N.E.2d 635 (Ind. App. 1976).
160. See, e.g., Tiger Motor Co. v. McMurtry, 284 Ala. 283, 224 So. 2d 638 (1969); Walcott
& Steele, Inc. v. Carpenter, 246 Ark. 75, 436 S.W.2d 820 (1969); George C. Christopher & Son,
Inc. v. Kansas Paint & Color Co., Inc., 215 Kan. 185, 523 P.2d 709 (1974); Hob's Refrigeration
& Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Poche, 304 So. 2d 326 (La. 1974); Sellman Auto, Inc. v. McGowan,
89 Nev. 353, 513 P.2d 1228 (1973); Gore v. George J. Ball, Inc., 279 N.C. 192, 182 S.E.2d 389
(1971). See generally Dailey v. Holiday Distrib. Corp., 260 Iowa 859, 151 N.W.2d 477 (1967);
Jerry Alderman Ford Sales, Inc. v. Bailey, 154 Ind. App. 632, 294 N.E.2d 617 (1973). C[.
Callahan v. Keystone Fireworks Mfg. Co., 72 Wash. 2d 823, 435 P.2d 626 (1967). Compare
Trane Co. v. Gilbert, 267 Cal. App. 2d 720, 73 Cal. Rptr 279 (1968) (architects knowledge of
limitation of remedy clauses charged to building owner, for whom architect was agent);
Adams v. J.1. Case Co., 125 Ill. App. 2d 388, 261 N.E.2d 1 (1970) (no proof that purchase
was not made with full knowledge of limitation and disclaimer terms).
161. Winant v. Approved Ladder & Equip. Corp., 31 App. Div. 2d 965, 298 N.Y.S.2d 796
(1969), aff'd, 28 N.Y.2d 529, 319 N.Y.S.2d 72, 267 N.E.2d 885 (1971).
162. Posttape Assoc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 387 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Pa. 1974), rev'd on
other grounds, 537 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1976). See also Admiral Oasis Hotel Corp. v. Home Gas
Indus. Inc., 68 I1. App. 2d 297, 216 N.E.2d 282 (1965). In Posttape, the notice was on
individual film containers which were in turn packaged in another container, thus making
actual notice of the disclaimer at the time of contracting highly remote. However, the Third
Circuit reversed the district court's decision on the ground that it erred in excluding evidence
as to whether the plaintiff was insured for the loss.
163. Dilks v. Flohr Chevrolet, 411 Pa. 425, 436, 192 A. 2d 682, 688 (1963). Accord, Prince
v. Paretti Pontiac Co., 381 So. 2d 112 (La. 1975).
164. See, e.g., Barker v. Colorado Region-Sports Car Club, 532 P.2d 372 (Colo. App. Ct.
1974); Dillon v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 315 A.2d 732 (Super. Ct. 1974). But, Hewitt
v. Miller, 11 Wash. App. 72, 521 P.2d 244 (1974).
165. Gates Rubber Co. v. USM Corp. 508 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1975).
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modified only if the seller clearly limits its liability, and the contract
must clearly convey that the risk of loss falls on the consumer-
buyer.' Thus, wh.,re the aggrieved party is less sophisticated, there
may be a greater burden imposed on the form offeror.
Some courts have gone further and require actual notice to the
disadvantaged party before a risk-shifting term will be upheld. The
requirement that a disclaimer must be conspicuous may mean that
it must be brought to the attention of a commercial buyer.' 7 A
proponent of an unusual contract term which is favorable to the
party with superior bargaining power must show a knowing and
voluntary agreement to that term.6 8' Even fulfilling the "as is" re-
quirement for implied warranty disclaimers'69 may be insufficient
unless the disclaimer is shown to have been meant as an intentional
relinquishment of a known right. 7 " In consumer transactions a gen-
eral disclaimer must be brought clearly to the buyer's attention and
then agreed to.'7 ' Similarly, a contract which does not inform a
consumer that he is waiving the right to insist that a product per-
form properly may be unenforceable. 7 ' And confession of judgment
clauses are not enforceable unless the party intelligently and know-
ingly waived his right to pretrial notice and hearing. 7 3
Risk-shifting terms in negotiated transactions are consistently
held enforceable.'74 However, in this situation the parties usually
have knowingly allocated the risks of loss. Many courts have not
gone so far as to require actual knowledge of the existence and effect
of a risk-shifting term before enforcing it. Some have held that if a
166. Hauter v. Zogarts, 14 Cal. 3d 104, 120 Cal. Rptr. 681, 534 P.2d 377 (1975); see Sutter
v. St. Clair Motors, Inc., 44 Ill. App. 2d 318, 194 N.E.2d 674 (1963).
167. Fairchild Indus. v. Maritime Air Serv., Ltd., 274 Md. 181, 333 A.2d 313 (1975).
168. Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 459 Pa. 450, 329 A.2d 312 (1974).
See Weaver v. American Oil Co., 257 Ind. 458, 276 N.E.2d 144 (1971).
169. U.C.C. § 2-316(2), (4).
170. Turner v. Int'l. Harvestor Co., 133 N.J. Super. 277, 336 A.2d 62 (Sup. Ct. Law Div.
1975).
171. Hiigel v. Gen. Motors Corp., 544 P.2d 983 (Colo. 1976).
172. Rehurek v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 262 So.2d 452 (Fla. App. 1972).
173. Star Fin. Co. v. McGee, 27 Ill. App. 3d 421, 326 N.E.2d 518 (1975).
174. See, e.g., Vitex Mfg. Corp. v. Cribtex Corp., 377 F.2d 795 (3d Cir. 1967); Cyrogenic
Equip. Co. v. Southern Nitrogen, Inc., 490 F.2d 696 (8th Cir. 1974); Royal Indem. Co. v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 385 F. Supp. 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Potomac Elec. Power Co. v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 385 F. Supp. 572 (D.D.C. 1974); Sterner Aero AB v. Page Airmo-
tive, Inc., 499 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1974) (disclaimers effective to bar warranty theory of
recovery, but not to cut off recovery on strict tort or negligence liability); Raybond Elec. v.
Glen-Mar Door Mfg. Co., 22 Ariz. App. 409, 528 P.2d 409 (1974). See Gates Rubber Co. v.
USM Corp., 351 F. Supp. 329, 334-35 (S.D. I1. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 508 F.2d 603
(7th Cir. 1975). See also Texaco v. A.A. Gold Inc., 78 Misc.2d 1050, 357 N.Y.S.2d 951 (Sup.
Ct.), aff'd, 45 App. Div.2d 1048, 358 N.Y.S.2d 973 (1974).
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clause is conspicuous, it is enforceable.' Others have upheld a
clause which was "sufficiently clear" to apprise the complainant of
a waiver, including the right to a jury trial,'76 and have enforced a
general disclaimer.'77 Still others have held that even a clause in fine
print containing complex and restrictive language is not uncon-
scionable.'78
A person's ignorance or lack of ignorance of the contract is also
measured by that person's previous experience, i.e. whether the
existence of a risk-shifting clause is unexpected or surprising.'79 The
existence of the same or similar clauses in previous contracts be-
tween the same parties, or between the complainant and other sup-
pliers, may defeat a claim of unconscionability." And a complain-
ant's general knowledge of the risks, whether agricultural or com-
mercial, may result in a limitation of remedy clause (providing for
a refund of the purchase price) being enforced.''
Courts generally reject a claim of unconscionability where no ig-
norance of the contract is shown.'82 Other decisions conclude that
the complainant knew of the disputed term' 3 or rely upon the ag-
grieved's profession and training, 4 business experience,' 85 or general
175. See, e.g., Velez v. Craine & Clarke Lumber Corp., 41 App.Div. 2d 747, 341 N.Y.S.2d
248 (1973); Bakal v. Burroughs Corp., 74 Misc. 2d 202, 343 N.Y.S.2d 541 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
176. See, e.g., David v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 59 Misc. 2d 248, 298 N.Y.S.2d
847 (App. Term. 1969).
177. See, e.g., Recreatives, Inc. v. Myers, 67 Wisc. 2d 255, 226 N.W.2d 474 (1975).
178. See, e.g., Central Ohio Coop. Milk Producers, Inc. v. Rowland, 29 Ohio App. 2d 236,
281 N.E.2d 42 (1972). See In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
179. J.D. Pavlak, Ltd. v. William Davies Co., 40 Ill. App. 3d 1, 351 N.E.2d 243 (1976).
180. See, e.g., Garretson v. United States, 456 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1972); Dow Corning
Corp. v. Capital Aviation, Inc., 411 F.2d 622 (7th Cir. 1969); Boone Val Coop. Processing
Ass'n v. French Oil Mill Mach. Co., 383 F. Supp. 606 (N.D. Iowa 1974); Architectural Alumi-
num Corp. v. Macarr, Inc., 70 Misc. 2d 495, 333 N.Y.S.2d 818 (Sup. Ct. 1972). See County
Asphalt, Inc. v. Lewis Welding & Eng'r Corp., 323 F. Supp. 1300 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 444
F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1971).
181. See, e.g., United States Fibers, Inc. v. Proctor & Schwartz, 358 F. Supp. 449 (E.D.
Mich. 1972), aff'd, 509 F.2d 1043 (6th Cir. 1975); Kleven v. Geigy Agricultural Chem., 303
Minn. 320 227 N.W.2d 566 (1975).
182. E.g., Personal Fin. Co. v. Meredith, 39 Ill. App. 3d 695, 350 N.E.2d 781 (1976); Gabl
v. Alaska Loan & Invest. Co., 6 Wash. App. 880, 496 P.2d 548 (1972).
183. See, e.g., Lundstrom v. Radio Corp., 17 Utah 2d 114, 405 P.2d 339 (1965); First N.J.
Bank v. F.L.M. Business Mach., Inc., 130 N.J. Super. 151, 325 A.2d 843 (Sup. Ct. Law Div.
1974); Abel Holding Co. v. Am. Dist. Tel. Co., 138 N.J. Super. 137, 350 A.2d 292 (Sup. Ct.
Law Div. 1975); D.O.V. Graphics, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 46 Ohio Misc. 37, 347 N.E.2d
561 (1976). See King v. South Jersey Nat'l Bank, 66 N.J. 161, 330 A.2d 1 (1974).
184. See, e.g., K & C Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 437 Pa. 303, 263 A.2d 390 (1970);
State Bank v. Hickey, 29 App. Div. 2d 993, 288 N.Y.S.2d 980 (1968). But see Kaye v.
Coughlin, 443 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
185. See, e.g., Mortgage Investors v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 278 Md. 505, 366 A.2d
47 (1976); Bill Stremmel Motors, Inc. v. IDS Leasing Corp., 89 Nev. 414, 514 P.2d 654 (1973);
Barnes v. Helfenbein, 548 P.2d 1014 (Okla. 1976); K & C, Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
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sophistication"' to uphold the clause. Finally, some courts have
rejected an unconscionability argument simply on the ground that
a person is presumed to be bound by a written contract even if that
person has not read the contract, or could not have understood it if
he had read it."78
These rules demonstrate that unconscionability is based in part
upon situations where the complaining party is excusably ignorant
of the purported agreement. Knowledge of the terms of an agree-
ment is of course necessary for actual assent to a contract. Hence
actual knowledge is involved in cases which discuss unconscion-
ability in terms of whether the aggrieved party was deprived of a
meaningful choice. 88 Logically, before one can exercise a choice as
to the terms of an exchange, that person must know and understand
those terms.
Lack of Choice
A substantial number of decisions identify unconscionable con-
tracts as those involving lack of choice, or lack of a meaningful
choice. In only a limited number of these situations, however, is lack
of choice in contract terms, i.e., the "take-it-or-leave-it" adhesion
contract, enough in itself to cause a court to declare a contract or
clause enforceable. In most of the decisions citing lack of choice in
contract terms as ground for a finding of unconscionability, one of
the three aforementioned bases of unconscionability coexisted inde-
pendently as an operative fact. A consideration typically recurring
in many decisions is the commercial reasonableness of the terms.
Ignorance of the contract is also frequently cited together with a lack
of choice, while ignorance of the risk is less commonly articulated
in lack of choice cases. 18 9
Most decisions which cite a lack of alternative terms as a factor
in identifying an unconscionable contract also rely upon the ag-
437 Pa. 303, 263 A.2d 390 (1970); Block v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 286 A.2d 228 (D.C. 1972);
State Bank v. Hickey, 29 App. Div. 2d 993, 288 N.Y.S.2d 980 (1968); Wedner v. Fidelity
Security Sys., Inc., 307 A.2d 429 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1973).
186. See, e.g., Southwest Forest Indus. Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 422 F.2d 1013
(9th Cir. 1970); Cyclops Corp. v. Home Ins. Co., 389 F. Supp. 476 (W.D. Pa. 1975). W.L. May
Co. v. Philco-Ford Corp., 543 P.2d 283 (Or. Sup. Ct. 1975); Avenell v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 41 Ohio App. 2d 150, 324, N.E.2 583 (1974). See Gelderman & Co., Inc. v. Lane
Processing, Inc., 527 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1975) (aggrieved party a "large corporate entity").
187. E.g., Washington v. Claasen, 218 Kan. 577, 545 P.2d 387, 391 (1976).
188. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Weaver
v. American Oil Co., 257 Ind. 458, 276 N.E.2d 144 (1971).
189. Weaver v. American Oil Co., 257 Ind. 458, 276 N.E.2d (1971). See Sarfati v. M.A.
Hittner & Sons, Inc., 35 App. Div. 2d 1004, 318 N.Y.S.2d 352 (1970), aff'd, 30 N.Y.2d 613,
331 N.Y.S. 2d 40, 282 N.E.2d 126 (1972). Cf., Collins v. Uniroyal, Inc., 64 N.J. 260, 315 A.2d
16 (1974).
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grieved party's ignorance of the terms. Some decisions merely state
that an "unusual" contract term'9 " or a risk-shifting clause 9' must
be knowingly and voluntarily assumed. Other courts state that con-
sumers must be put on fair notice of a disclaimer or modification of
warranties and freely agree to those terms.'92 Still others are more
explicit, stating that disproportionate levels of education, language
and deceptive sales techniques affect the parties' bargaining power
and may deprive the buyer of a meaningful choice. 9 3 And, to the
extent that fraud and overreaching deprive one of a meaningful
choice, those clauses are also unconscionable. 4
While they include facts to suggest ignorance of the contract,
other decisions depart from this pattern and indicate that lack of
choice in itself may cause a contract to be unconscionable. "[A]
weaker party [because of a lack of education or financial means]
is frequently not in a position to shop around for better terms, either
because the author of the standard contract has a monopoly or
because all competitors use the same clauses."' 95 However, only a
few decisions have held a contract or clause unenforceable solely
because of a lack of choice. Distinguishing these decisions, perhaps,
is that they typically have involved so-called items of necessity:'"
public housing for itinerant workers;'97 apartments in areas where
those dwellings are scarce;'98 and even the private automobile.99 The
argument has also been accepted in commercial transactions where
there exists a disparity of bargaining position."" Even a dealer who
merely transmits the product to a consumer may have a plea of
necessity and lack of choice where a disclaimer or remedy limitation
term is held unconscionable as to the buyer. 0'
190. Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 459 Pa. 450, 329 A.2d 312 (1974).
191. E.g., Star Fin. Corp. & McGee, 27 Ill. App. 3d 421, 326 N.E.2d 518 (1975).
192. Hauter v. Zogarts, 14 Cal. 3d 104, 120 Cal. Rptr 681, 534 P.2d 377 (1975).
193. Albert Merrill School v. Godoy, 78 Misc. 2d 647, 357 N.Y.S.2d 378 (S. Ct. 1974).
Accord, Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
194. See, Tai Ken Indus. Co., Ltd. v. M/V Hamburg, 528 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1976).
195. Weaver v. American Oil Co., 257 Ind. 458,.276 N.E. 2d 144, 147 (1971). But as will
be discussed below, the real judicial objection to these clauses may be the risk transferred, a
risk of which the aggrieved person may be ignorant or have no control. See, text accompany-
ing notes 287-89 infra.
196. E.g., Weidman v. Tomaselli, 81 Misc. 2d 328, 365 N.Y.S.2d 681 (County Ct. 1975).
197. Gonzalez v. County of Hildago, 489 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1973).
198. Harwood v. Lincoln Square Apts., 78 Misc. 2d 1097, 359 N.Y.S.2d 387 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.
1974).
199. Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Pa. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 502 F.2d
1107 (3d Cir. 1974). Contra, Block v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 286 A.2d 228 (D.C. 1972).
200. See Monsanto Co. v. Alden Leeds, Inc., 130 N.J. Super 245, 326 A.2d 90 (1975).
201. Sarfati v. M.A. Hittner & Sons, Inc., 35 App. Div. 2d 1004, 318 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1970),
aff'd., 30 N.Y.2d 613, 331 N.Y.S. 2d 40, 282 N.E.2d 126 (1972).
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Another group of decisions have found that the complainant had
adequate alternatives such as foregoing the particular purchase2 ' or
an adequate substitute remedy,1 3 and hence found the contract to
be enforceable. Note that where there are adequate alternatives,
there is at least some choice of terms. Similarly, claims may be
rejected for failure to prove a lack of choice.20 4 Finally, courts have
refused to consider this type of argument seriously where the con-
tracting parties were able to bargain, and the complainant had bar-
gained successfully on other terms of the agreement."5
Another popular approach to this problem is taken by courts
which rely upon the substantive characteristics of the exchange in
resolving a claim of unconscionability. Specifically, they consider
whether the clause is unreasonable or against public policy, and if
the exchange is inadequate or unfair. One court considered uncon-
scionability in terms of economic duress. It refused to hold the con-
tract unconscionable without more evidence as to its commercial
reasonableness, despite the aggrieved party's evident lack of
choice. 200 Conversely, a release executed by a patient which a hospi-
tal sought to enforce was condemned because "the releasing party
does not really acquiesce voluntarily in the contractual shifting of
the risk, nor can we be reasonably certain he receives an adequate
consideration for the transfer."2 7 In a different context, an exchange
may be unconscionable if necessities force an individual to execute
what amounts to a perpetual guarantee of future loans to another,
the problem being "inadequate consideration." 20°8 A lack of bargain-
ing power, together with a public policy to protect the class of per-
sons to whom the aggrieved party belongs, against "the disarma-
202. See Mortgage Investors of Washington v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 278 Md. 505,
366 A.2d 47 (1976).
203. County Asphalt, Inc. v. Lewis Welding & Eng'r Corp., 323 F. Supp. 1300 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), aff'd 444 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1971). See First N.J. Bank v. F.L.M. Business Machines,
Inc., 130 N.J. Super 151, 325 A.2d 843 (1974).
204. Personal Fin. Co. v. Meredith, 297 Minn. 457, 214 N.W.2d 698 (1973); Morris v.
Capitol Furniture & Appliance Co., 280 A. 2d 775 (D.C. App. 1971); Block v. Ford Motor
Credit Co., 286 A.2d 228 (D.C. 1972).
205. Fleishman Distilling Co. v. Distillers Co., 395 F. Supp. 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See,
Royal Indem. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 385 F. Supp. 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). In the latter
case, the court was impressed by the fact that the aggrieved party had been reimbursed by
its insurer for its loss.
206. In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864 (E.D. Pa. 1966). Cf., McNussen v.
Graybeal, 146 Mont. 173, 405 P.2d 447 (1965), citing 5 S. WLiSTON, CONTRACTS § 1618 for
the proposition that there is no broad doctrine foreholding a person from taking advantage
of the adversity of another to drive a hard bargain. 405 P.2d at 454.
207. Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal.2d 92, 98, 383 P.2d 441, 446, 32 Cal. Rptr
33, 38 (1963).
208. Indianapolis Morris Plan v. Sparks, 132 Ind. App. 145, 172 N.E.2d 899 (1961).
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ment" of the rights of buyers by large corporate sellers through the
use of warranty disclaimers may also cause such terms to be unen-
forceable.' 9
Finally, the validity of contractual clauses as to which the ag-
grieved party had no meaningful choice may be tested by inquiring
whether the clause is commercially reasonable.210 Compare a secu-
rity clause which provides that a seller can claim a balance due on
all items previously purchased from it by a particular buyer so long
as the total installment contract price of all the items has not been
paid, with a security term which applies installment payments on
several items purchased from a single seller to the items first pur-
chased. The former has been held commercially unreasonable,",
while the latter was not."' Another clause found unreasonably favor-
able to the offeror granted an apartment builder the unilateral right
to extend the time for delivery of possession, while prohibiting the
potential tenant from cancelling.' A contract which provides that
a tenant becomes liable for the lessor's attorney's fees as soon as
an action is commenced for even an immaterial breach or default
is also unconscionable because it is unreasonable.2" Nor is there
any rational relationship between a contract provision for a non-
refundable enrollment fee and any damage a vocational school
might sustain as a result of an enrollee dropping out."' But a limita-
tion of liability clause is not commercially unreasonable simply be-
cause of the "inherent element of risk" involved in connection with
a sale of crop seed."' Nor is it commercially unreasonable to provide
that a commodity futures account could be liquidated without de-
mand or notice if an adequate margin were not maintained."
The Principle
The rules of unconscionability identify four factors which alone,
or in combination, may make a contract unconscionable. Neverthe-
209. Steele v. J.I. Case Co., 197 Kan. 554, 419 P.2d 902 (1966).
210. Barnes v. Helfenbein, 548 P.2d 1014 (Okla. 1976); Patterson v. Walker-Thomas
Furniture Co., 277 A.2d 111 (D.C. 1971); Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. Jimeniz, 82 Misc. 2d
948, 371 N.Y.S.2d 289 (Civ. Ct. 1975).
211. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
212. Singer Co. v. Gardner, 65 N.J. 403, 323 A.2d 457 (1975).
213. Seabrook v. Commuter Housing Co., Inc., 72 Misc. 2d 6, 338 N.Y.S.2d 67 (Civ. Ct.
1972), aff'd on other grounds, 79 Misc. 2d 168, 363 N.Y.S.2d 566 (App. Term 1971).
214. Weideman v. Tomaselli, 81 Misc. 2d 828, 365 N.Y.S.2d 681 (County Ct. 1975).
215. Educational Beneficial, Inc. v. Reynolds, 67 Misc. 739, 324 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Civ. Ct.
1971).
216. Billings v. Joseph Harris Co., 27 N.C. App. 689, 220 S.E.2d 361 (1975).
217. Gelderman & Co. v. Lane Processing, Inc., 527 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1975).
19781
Loyola University Law Journal
less, there are decisions, as the discussion above indicates, which are
apparently inconsistent with these rules, even though the underly-
ing fact situations are indistinguishable. It is impossible to harmo-
nize the decisions on a "rule of decision" basis, hence there cannot
be a unitary rule of unconscionability. Rather, if the focus is on the
literal holding of the courts, the rules of the cases yield the unwork-
able list of considerations cited at the outset of this article.
Considered together, however, these judicially developed rules do
suggest factors and a principle of unconscionability. Where an ag-
grieved party is ignorant of the risk involved, ignorant of the con-
tract terms which transfer or allocate that risk and/or lacks alterna-
tive terms for that risk allocation, the contract or clause may be
unconscionable and unenforceable. Also, if the exchange is grossly
unfair, against public policy or is commercially unreasonable, the
same may be the result. Stated simply, contract terms which trans-
fer risks or the burdens of a transaction from that which might be
expected in an exchange, absent a written agreement, are unen-
forceable unless intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily assumed.
This assumption of risk may either be proved by direct evidence or
by inference from the parties' status and surrounding circumstan-
ces. And even if there is a lack of this proof, the contract may be
sometimes enforced if the terms are, in fact, fair and reasonable.
The rules also reflect upon the utility of relying upon the
procedural-substantive unconscionability dichotomy to analyze the
cases. To some extent this distinction is helpful. For example,
grossly unfair terms may be unenforceable for their substance alone,
though such decisions are rare. In point of fact, however, cases are
rare in which these lines of distinction between procedure and sub-
stance are not blurred. For example, in considering the parties'
knowledge of the risk, a procedural consideration, frequent reference
is made to considerations of a substantive nature, e.g., the fairness
or reasonableness of the exchange. Similarly, where lack of choice
is in issue, the most procedural of the factors in theory, the courts
often revert to reliance upon fairness and reasonableness of the
terms. Contrast this with the cases in which it is the parties' subjec-
tive knowledge of the contract terms which is in issue. In such cases,
there is often little or no reliance placed upon substantive considera-
tions. Thus, it is evident that the procedural-substantive dichot-
omy, though of theoretical interest, has little application in prac-
tice.
Courts do not decide cases on the basis of "substantive" or
"procedural" unconscionability-"naughtiness" if you will'-' -
though they sometimes use these terms. Rather they are moved
217.1. The description is Professor Leff's.
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by the factors indicated herein. The principle of unconscionability
rests not on two legs of procedural and substantive factors, but on
four: (1) unfair terms and exchanges; (2) ignorance of the risk; (3)
ignorance of the contract; and, (4) lack of choice. Risk-shifting
terms must be intelligently, knowingly and voluntarily assumed.
Those terms which are not intelligently or voluntarily assumed
must be fair.
ANALYZING THE PRINCIPLE
The Principle and the Notion of Contract
It has never seriously been contended that unconscionability is
inconsistent with the basic idea of a contract." Indeed, a review of
the foregoing decisions indicates that unconscionability may be con-
sidered a "mirror-image" of what is a contract, in that the grounds
for a finding of unconscionability reflect the necessary elements of
a contract. The nexus, of course, is not whether a contract was
made, but the extent to which that contract should be enforced.
1. The Classic Contract
If there is such a thing as a classic contract it is found where there
is a manifestation of mutual assent by parties competent to contract
to exchange goods, services, money or promises, i.e. consideration,
and to allocate the risks of that exchange.2 19 The traditional grounds
for avoidance of contract performance, e.g. fraud, duress and mis-
take, proceed logically from these elements. Fraud, 20 duress 22 and
218. The consistency of the doctrine with the theories of what is proper proof or manifesta-
tion of a contract will be dealt with below. See text accompanying notes 249-62, infra.
219. See, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §19(1) (1964), which states: "The forma-
tion of a contract requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual assent to
the exchange and a consideration."
220. The Restatement of Contracts defines fraud as:
(a) a misreprestnation known to be such, or
(b) concealment, or
(c) non-disclosure where it is not privileged by any person intending or expecting
thereby to cause a mistake by another to exist or to continue, in order to induce
the latter to enter into or refrain him from entering into a transaction;...
Id. § 471.
Misrepresentation is defined as:
(1) any manifestation by words or other conduct by one person to another that,
under the circumstances, amounts to an assertion not in accordance with the facts.
Id. § 470.
The Restatement further states that:
Non-disclosure is not privileged by a party who. ..
(c) occupies such a relation to the other party as to justify the latter in expecting
that his interests will be cared for.
Id. §472.
The comments to section 471 indicate that the essence of fraud is "conscious misconduct."
221. Duress is defined by the Restatement as:
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undue influence" are based upon the theory that contracts so in-
duced should not be enforced against the aggrieved party, because
it was precluded from exercising its free will and choice in entering
into the contract, and because of the wrongful conduct of the other
party.223 This wrongful conduct includes any conduct which pre-
vents the exercise by the other party of its free will. Whether the
rationale is lack of assent or deterrence of improper conduct, the
principle is the same: contracts must be the product of actual as-
sent. Similarly, the defenses of mistake2 4 and incapacity225 are
based upon a lack of real assent to the exchange in fact, as distin-
guished from the parties' subjective perceptions and outward mani-
festations. Finally, illegal contracts, 26 or those agreements which
are against public policy, are unenforceable for obvious reasons of
sovereignty.
(a) any wrongful act of one person that compels a manifestation of apparent
assent by another to a transaction without his volition, or
(b) any wrongful threat of one person by words or other conduct that induces
another to enter into a transaction under the influence of such fear as precludes him
from exercising free will and judgment, if the threat was intended or should reason-
ably have been expected to operate as an inducement.
Id. § 492.
Comment (g) to this section states that the acts must be wrongful, i.e. contrary to public
policy. Acts fitting this description are those "that involve abuse of legal remedies or that
are wrongful in a moral sense; if made use of as a means of causing fear" and that these acts
"vitiate a transaction induced by that fear, though not in themselves legal wrongs."
Id. § 492, com. (g).
222. Undue influence is defined by the Restatement:
Where a party is under the domination of another, or by virtue of the relations
between them is justified in assuming that the other party will not act in a manner
inconsistent with his welfare, a transaction induced by unfair persuasion of the
latter, is induced by undue influence and is voidable.
Id. § 497.
Undue influence apparently differs only in the matter of degree from duress, since both have
a "wrongful act" with the end result of misconduct overcoming the free will of the injured
party. Note, Duress and Undue Influence-A Comparative Analysis, 22 BAYLOR L. REv. 572
(1970).
223. Of course, where a third party overcomes the free informed will of the aggrieved
party, these theories are still applicable, but the vast majority of the cases implementing
these theories involve only the parties to the bargain.
224. Mistake is simply defined as "a state of mind that is not in accord with the facts."
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, § 500 (1932). The Restatement also states that "If B knows or,
because of the amount of the bid or otherwise, has reason to know that A is acting under a
mistake, the contract is voidable by A; otherwise not." Id. § 503. The latter is the rule for
unilateral mistake, while the former definition governs for mutual mistake. "Mistake" does
not refer to an error in judgment, but a misapprehension of the actual facts. See, id. § 500,
com. (a).
225. Under Section 18 of the Restatement, a person does not have the capacity to contract
when "he is (a) under guardianship, (b) an infant, (c) mentally ill or defective, or (d) intoxi-
cated." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 18 (1964).
226. The Restatement of Contracts defines an illegal bargain (and thus one which is
unenforceable) as one where "either its formation or its performance is criminal, tortious, or
otherwise opposed to public policy." Id. § 512.
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2. The Unconscionable Contract
The bases of the doctrine of unconscionability closely parallel the
notions inherent in the classic contract. For instance, grossly unfair
exchanges or exchanges which lack any semblance of reciprocity 27
are like agreements unsupported by consideration. Another instance
where a contract is unconscionable due to the aggrieved party's
ignorance of the contract terms2 28 suggests a lack of capacity to
contract. Another example of this parallel is where a term is not part
of the basic bargain,2 9 thus indicating a lack of real or manifest
assent to the "agreement," but also indicative of lack of choice. The
most significant parallel, though, is that negotiated transactions
and exchanges which should have been negotiated2 0 are not uncon-
scionable, just as the classic contract model is normally enforce-
able . 131
The traditional grounds for avoidance of performance are also
reflected in the rules and principle of unconscionability. Ignorance
of the risk 2 is analogous to mutual mistake, but without the re-
quirement that both parties be mistaken as to the same risk. Igno-
rance of the contract may be caused by deceptive sales techniques, 233
which suggests a fraud or misrepresentation. Application is similar
in the case of a unilateral mistake, i.e., the non-mistaken party
cannot hold the other to the latter's error if the former reasonably
should have realized that an error was made. Also present in those
situations is the idea that the unmistaken party is abusing the privi-
lege of judicial enforcement of private law and that the advantage
stemming from such a substantive imbalance in the transaction
should not be exploited.2 34 The principles of duress and undue influ-
ence also find parallels where a person is confronted with a lack of
227. E.g., cases cited notes 21-25, supra.
228. E.g., cases cited notes 131-34, supra.
229. E.g., cases cited note 152, supra.
230. A party "should" negotiate, or attempt to negotiate, a contract if it has the sophisti-
cation and appointments to do so in a meaningful manner. See also note 300 and accompany-
ing text, infra.
231. E.g., cases cited notes 153 & 174, supra.
232. See cases cited notes 96-115 and accompanying text, supra.
233. See cases cited notes 133-36, supra.
234. In John J. Calhan Co. v. Talsma Builders, 40 Ill. App. 3d 62, 351 N.E.2d 334 (1976),
rev'd on other grounds, 67 Ill. 2d 213, 367 N.E.2d 695 (1977), the court held that a construction
contract could be rescinded because of the unilateral mistake of a subcontractor in its bid
because: (1) the mistake was related to a material feature of the contract; (2) the mistake
was of such "grave consequence" that enforcement would be unconscionable; (3) the mistake
occurred despite the exercise of reasonable care by the subcontractor; and (4) the other party
could be returned to its original position.
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choice,23 for in each instance the "free-will" of the disadvantaged
party is restricted.
3. Historical and Modern Uses of Unconscionability
This article has thus far focused on recent decisions applying the
principle of unconscionability and demonstrated the predominance
of the bargaining (or "procedural") aspects in those decisions. While
it is arguable that unconscionability historically has been a doctrine
primarily oriented towards the fairness of the exchange (the
"substantive aspect of the contract), the converse is in fact the
situation. Hence, the principle articulated herein is consistent with
the courts' longstanding application of the doctrine.
Many cases include references to two Supreme Court opinions
and an English case for a statement of the doctrine, a statement
which sounds quite oriented towards the fairness of the exchange.
In Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, the court stated that an uncons-
cionable contract is one that "no man in his senses and not under
delusion would make on the one hand and no honest and fair man
would accept."' 1 This concept was adopted in two frequently cited
Supreme Court decisions, the majority opinion in Scott v. United
States,2 17 and Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in United
States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.25 Many other courts in the past
century have also suggested that unconscionability is triggered by
the unevenness of an exchange, ignoring the bargaining process.2 3
A closer look at Janssen, Bethlehem Steel and other cases, how-
ever, indicates the primacy of the bargaining process. Janssen was
a mistake and misrepresentation case. After the statement quoted
above, the court went on to discuss species of fraud. It further com-
mented upon the bargaining deficiencies in that transaction, and
other situations where one tries to take "surreptitious advantage of
235. See cases cited notes 189-217 and accompanying text, supra.
236. 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 100-01 (1750).
237. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 443, 445 (1871).
238. 315 U.S. 289 at 326-27 (1941).
239. E.g., Lear v. Choteau, 23 Ill. 39 (1859); Dreyer v. Goldy, 62 Ill. App. 347 (1896),
appeal dism'd. 171 Ill. 434, 49 N.E. 560 (1898). In Lear the court expressly declined to base
its decision on evidence which demonstrated that the aggrieved party had not understood the
contract but had been duped into its execution. In Dreyer, the court held unconscionable, as
usurious, an agreement whereby a broker would receive $1,000 a year for 10 years or for
however long the borrower should live, whichever was longer, for his services in securing for
the borrower a $22,000 loan. In marked contrast to these decisions is Barnes v. Helfenbein,
548 P.2d 1014 (Okla. 1976), where the court upheld a note secured by a mortgage, which had
an effective rate of interest of about 38%, because the court found a referenced statute to
permit an effective interest rate of up to 45% in such a transaction and the borrower was "an
astute businesswoman" who had knowingly and voluntarily agreed to the transaction and
loan.
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the weakness or necessity of another. . .This court therefore re-
lieves against all such underhand bargains."240 In United States v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., Justice Frankfurter complained of the
"unconscionable advantage" worked by Bethlehem Steel against
the government because of its war needs."' In essence, he was com-
plaining about the government's lack of choice and, perhaps, the
commercial unreasonableness of the contract. This tendency to
equate unconscionability with shortcomings in the bargaining pro-
cess is also seen in the Court's decision in the The Elfrida.42 In that
case it was held that the collection of sums due under a contract for
services was not unconscionable or exorbitant in the absence of
fraud or mistake. The Court placed great emphasis on the knowing
and uncoerced agreement of the shipowners to the agreement. The
danger of abuse in salvage contracts was acknowledged, but the
knowing and voluntary assent insulated the reasonableness of the
compensation from judicial scrutiny.
Many modern decisions which regulate the exchange itself are
based upon assumptions and fact patterns involving deficiencies in
the bargaining process. A decision that an inconspicuous warranty
disclaimer should not be enforced because the party disadvantaged
by it could not be expected to be aware of it has been stated as a
rule of public policy 43 and has been further endorsed by the Code
in section 2-316. Indeed, a great many statutes controlling the terms
of commercial exchanges can be traced to legislative concern over
recurring deficiencies in the bargaining process.
A classic expression of judicial intolerance for inadequacies in the
bargaining process is Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co."'
In Walker-Thomas, the court felt an uneducated and unsophisti-
cated person may have had no meaningful choice with regard to the
inclusion in an installment sales contract of a cross-collateral secu-
rity clause, thereby holding that term vulnerable to a claim of un-
conscionability. The likelihood of such deficiencies occurring in
other consumer transactions led to the requirement in the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code that installment payments be applied by the
seller proportionately and that, once an item was paid for, no secu-
rity interest could be reinstated simply by another purchase. 4 For
consumer transactions, many legislatures presume that the con-
240. 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 100-01 (1750).
241. 315 U.S. 289 at 326-27 (1941).
242. 172 U.S. 186 (1898).
243. E.g., Sutter v. St. Clair Motors, 44 Ill. App. 2d 318, 194 N.E.2d. 674 (1963).
244. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
245. E.g., MD. [Com. Law] CODE ANN. § 12-618 (1975).
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sumer is not likely to read or understand the contract, or otherwise
appreciate the risks which may be transferred by a contract. They
presume that the consumer will have no real choice in contract
terms, assuming that he or she can and will appreciate the signifi-
cance of a written document or "contract." ' It is because of these
considerations, with the attendant likelihood of abuse where these
bargaining factors are absent, that legislation regulates many as-
pects of the permitted exchanges in the consumer retail market.
These rules may appear to be directed only to the substance or
terms of the exchange, but the legislative rationale manifests con-
cern over the deficiencies in the bargaining process.24
The consistent rejection of unconscionability attacks upon negoti-
ated exchanges indicates the general inconsistency between abuse
transactions (unconscionable contracts) and negotiated exchanges.
This is not to say, however, that a negotiated contract is never
unconscionable. Though the terms be negotiated, there may be an
unknown risk not specifically allocated by the agreement. It is also
possible courts might refuse to enforce the agreement, not because
of an abuse of the bargaining process between the parties, but for
public policy reasons because the agreement would adversely affect
the general public. Nevertheless, most decisions rest upon deficien-
cies in the particular bargaining process involved.248 If these
"procedural" unconscionability factors are not satisfied (i.e., there
is a knowing, intelligent and voluntary allocation of risks), this
"unruly horse" is much more predictable.
When the components of unconscionability are separated and
analyzed, the principle is consistent with historical theories of con-
tract, avoidance of contract performance and unconscionability. It
also provides a clearer analysis of modern statutes which regulate
the contractual relationships of certain classes of contracts, public
246. See also Note, Standard Form Contracts, 16 MOD. L. Rzv. 318 (1953). Also of interest
here is OR. REV. STAT. § 83.820 (1973) which provides that an assignee of a contract for the
sale or lease of consumer goods is subject to all defenses the consumer, buyer or lessee would
have against the seller or lessor. The section also states that this restriction does not apply
to any debt instrument owned, guaranteed or insured by any state or federal agency. This
evidences an assumption that such agencies either know the effect of making such a guaran-
tee, or that it is not unfair to deprive a governmental agency of the same rights enjoyed by a
consumer, and being treated like non-consumers.
247. Section 2-303 of the Code supports this analysis. That section, along with § 1-104,
makes clear that transactional risks and burdens may be allocated as the parties choose,
subject only to the prohibition against unreasonable time limitations and the general re-
straint of unconscionability.
248. E.g., Sutter v. St. Clair Motors, Inc., 44 Ill. App. 2d 318, 194 N.E.2d 674 (1963).
Indianapolis Morris Plant v. Sparks, 132 Ind. App. 145, 172 N.E.2d 899 (1961). See text
accompanying notes 83-86 supra.
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policy decisions, and unconscionability in the Code. The signifi-
cance of this, and of the presence of bargaining factors to defeat a
claim of unconscionability will be detailed below. First, however,
the principle and permissible proof of a contract must be consid-
ered.
The Principle and the Objective Theory of Contract
Whether an agreement was reached and whether fraud, mistake
and the like were present have always been considered outside the
parol evidence rule. Despite its similarities to these doctrines, how-
ever, the question of unconscionability does not arise until it has
been first determined that a non-voidable contract exists. 249 Thus,
one might conclude that proof of unconscionability is limited by the
elements of the objective theory of contract and its corollaries. The
cases demonstrate, however, that courts go beyond the four corners
of the written agreement to determine whether the agreement is
unconscionable. 210 The question then becomes whether courts are
free to consider any evidence in determining which terms are en-
forceable and which are not.
1. Status of the Theory
Because of the uncertainties and problems of proof inherent in
reliance on oral testimony, courts have long preferred written docu-
ments to show what the parties' agreement was at the time of con-
tracting. A written manifestation of assent was considered a more
practical way of measuring, or presuming, one's assent, than proof
of his or her actual intent. Putting an agreement in writing was also
thought to impress upon the parties the significance, and terms, of
their exchange. These and other considerations formed the basis of
the objective theory of contract. Attendant to this theory were corol-
lary rules including the duty to read and the parol evidence rule.
In recent years, however, the vitality of the duty to read and the
parol evidence rule has diminished. Courts increasingly ignore or
discount the duty to read.25' The parties' status, bargaining abilities
249. The objective theory of contract has found a contract to exist where a manifestation
of assent to contract, to be bound to an exchange which exchange could include terms of risk
allocation. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 21 (1964). This apparent agreement
must be carefully distinguished from the agreement in fact, the Code's definition of an
agreement. U.C.C. § 1-201(4).
250. See also Murray, supra note 2, where the author suggests an analysis of when a court
will go beyond the manifestation of assent to determine whether there is "real assent" to
challenged terms. The difference in the present analysis from Professor Murray's lies in the
jurisprudential differences between principles and rules and in the combination of commer-
cial reasonableness with choice.
251. Calamari, Duty to Read-A Changing Concept, 43 FolmAim L. Rxv. 341 (1974).
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and expectations, are increasingly determinative of whether parol
evidence is admissible to show the parties' agreement and con-
tract 
2
The Code itself makes express what some courts had done before
its adoption. The focus of the parties' agreement is upon the com-
mercial setting of the transaction, and the parties' course of dealing,
usage of tradez3 and course of performance 24 are relevant to explain
the agreement. As a practical matter, this evidence can change the
meaning of a document to a court unfamiliar with these practices.
Subsection 2 of section 2-302 of the Code also requires that a court
consider the commercial realities of the exchange when a claim of
unconscionability is made. Thus the inquiry into the parties' agree-
ment and whether that agreement is unconscionable does not stop
with the written document, but extends also to the commercial
setting of the transaction. Yet the determination of what constitutes
the contract 21 is still objective in theory.
2. Unconscionable Contracts in the Commercial
Setting-Relevant Inquiries
Courts have examined the factors of unconscionability discussed
above in analyzing whether a challenged contract or term was un-
conscionable in the commercial setting of the exchange. That set-
ting includes the circumstances surrounding the particular transac-
tion under review, and other similar transactions; i.e., the parties'
course of dealing and trade customs."' Where lack of choice is as-
serted, the commercial setting includes the choice available to the
aggrieved party in the transaction at hand, and alternatives avail-
able elsewhere in the market.257 As to the parties' knowledge of the
252. Childres & Spitz, Status in the Law of Contracts, 47 N.Y.U.L. Rlv. 1 (1972).
253. See § 1-205 of the Code, and the definition of "agreement" in § 1-201(3).
254. U.C.C. § 2-208.
255. Section 1-201(11) of the Code defines "contract" as "the total legal obligation which
results from the parties' agreement as affected by [the Code] and any other applicable rules
of law." In contrast, an "agreement" is "the bargain of the parties in fact as found by their
language or by implication from other circumstances including course of dealing or usage of
trade or course of performance . ..;" and does not determine whether that agreement is
enforceable under principles of contract law and the Code, i.e., whether it is a "contract."
U.C.C. § 1-201(3).
256. In Kohlenberger, Inc. v. Tyson's Foods, Inc., 510 S.W.2d 555 (Ark. 1974), the court
stated: "The question of unconscionability must be determined in light of general commercial
background, commercial needs in the trade or the particular case, the relative bargaining
position of the parties and other circumstances existing when the contract was made." Id. at
566.
257. See Block v. Ford Motors Credit Corp., 286 A.2d 228 (D.C. 1972). See generally
Murray, supra note 2.
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contract, their past course of dealings258 and the existence of insur-
ance to cover the loss 29 are relevant and admissible. Also, the
knowledge of the practices and customs of an industry in terms of
consensual risk-allocation may defeat a claim of unconsciona-
bility.25 0 However, evidence of such usage of trade is not admissible
unless the aggrieved party had sufficient notice so as not to be
"unfairly surprised. 2 6' Of course, implicit in the inquiry whether
the risk was knowingly allocated or shifted is the parties' expecta-
tions concerning risk-allocation. 22 Finally, the reasonableness of a
term, including its purpose, effect, and the need for it generally and
for the individual parties specifically are included within an inquiry
pursuant to section 2-302(2).231
Status and Bargaining Power
In discussing unconscionability, courts have made frequent refer-
ence to the parties' bargaining power in determining whether chal-
lenged terms are unconscionable. However, relative bargaining
power is merely a question of proof, the resolution of which may
suggest the term is unenforceable. The principle is not one of supe-
rior or unequal bargaining power, rather it is the fact of the com-
plainant's sophistication which may show that a risk has been
knowingly and voluntarily transferred. This analysis may appear to
be interchangeable with the question of relative bargaining power,
but it is entirely distinct, at least in theory.
258. Schroeden v. Fagoel Motors, Inc., 86 Wash. 2d 256, 544 P.2d 20 (1975). E.g., J.D.
Pavlak, Ltd. v. William Davies Co., 40 Ill. App. 3d 1, 351 N.E.2d 243 (1976).
259. Posttape Assoc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 537 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1976). See Abel Hold-
ing Co. v. Am. Dist. Tel. Co., 138 N.J. Super. 137, 350 A.2d 843 (Sup. Ct. Law Div. 1974). In
Posttape, the court held the existence of insurance to be an admissible item of proof under
rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, suggesting that this fact in itself could show
knowledge of a limitation of liability clause. A slightly different rationale was advanced in
Abel Holding where the court noted that the real party in interest in that case was the
complainant's insurer. The court stated that the insurer received premiums for its exposure
and must have been aware of the contracted limitation of liability, and hence was bound by
that term.
260. See Dow Coming Corp. v. Capital Aviation, Inc., 411 F.2d 622 (7th Cir. 1969).
261. U.C.C. § 1-205(6). Comment 6 of that section states that the subsection applies to
implicit clauses or terms which rest on usage of trade, just as the unconscionability require-
ment applies to express terms. Also, comment 10 states that 1-205(6) is designed "to insure
that this Act's liberal recognition of the needs of commerce in regard to usage of trade shall
not be made into an instrument of abuse."
262. A risk must be knowingly assumed. If the risk is not recognized by either party, who
must bear the risk may nevertheless be determined by the agreement. For example, if all risks
are given to one person, that unknown risk could also be assumed by that person, if he or
she knowingly and voluntarily did so.
263. E.g., In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864 (E.D. Pa. 1966); W.L. May Co. v.
Philco Ford Corp., 543 P.2d 283 (Or. Sup. Ct. 1975). See U.C.C. § 1-205, com. 6.
Loyola University Law Journal
An examination of several cases demonstrates that unequal bar-
gaining power has been used to determine whether one of the above
bases of unconscionability existed. The presence of disparate bar-
gaining power tends to negate any opportunity for meaningful nego-
tiation."4 It may also indicate that the aggrieved party had no
meaningful choice."5 Hence, courts have regarded the existence of
unequal bargaining power as a significant factor requiring judicial
scrutiny of warranty disclaimers, limitation of liability and exculpa-
tory clauses."0 Mere disparity of bargaining power is not enough in
itself to establish unconscionability, 7 though it does suggest a dan-
ger for abuse. 68
A precise description of the relationship of unconscionability to
situations involving disparate bargaining power must take the sta-
tus, or relative sophistication of the parties into account, as well as
their economic muscle. Without the competence to use one's bar-
gaining power effectively, that power is meaningless. Further, when
the courts note the relative economic strength of the parties, they
also are recognizing, either expressly or implicitly, the parties' rela-
tive sophistication. Sophistication, or status, pertains directly to a
person's ability to negotiate and appreciate the significance of con-
tracting, questions intimately connected with the notion of con-
tract. Ultimately, though, whether there is a relative equilibrium of
economic power is irrelevant to whether the parties' knowingly, in-
telligently, and voluntarily allocated the risks and burdens of a
transaction. Thus, the principle is not simply one of disparate bar-
gaining power.26 9
Like the existence of disparate bargaining power, status alone
cannot be equated with unconscionability, though it is indicative of
its applicability. A person's experience and sophistication in com-
mercial transactions may preclude an unconscionability chal-
lenge.270 Such a person cannot excusably ignore the printed terms
of a proferred document as the contract prior to an agreement to
deal.2 17 A person who has the ability to negotiate or who can be
charged with knowledge of the terms of an agreement is in a poor
264. Cf. Gaskin v. Stumm Handel GmbH, 390 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
265. Cf. Jefferson Credit Corp. v. Marcano, 60 Misc. 2d 138, 302 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Civ. Ct.
1969).
266. E.g., Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279 (Alaska 1976); Hy-Grade Oil
Co. v. N.J. Bank, 138 N.J. Super. 112, 350 A.2d 279 (App. 1975).
267. Sinkoff Beverage Co. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 51 Misc. 2d 446, 273 N.Y.S.2d 364
(S. Ct. 1966).
268. See Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (S. Ct. 1969).
269. Accord, U.C.C. § 2-302, com. 1.
270. See cases cited notes 184-86 supra.
271. Gaskin v. Stumm Handel GmbH, 390 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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position to argue unconscionability later. Similarly, one who suc-
cessfully negotiates portions of an agreement but cannot alter the
terms challenged, 72 or one who could have negotiated away a dis-
claimer but did not attempt to negotiate the terms of the exchange
other than those related to the product,273 is bound to the agreement.
A person's status is an indication of whether its claim of unconscion-
ability is well-taken. But, again, it is not the exclusive means of
measuring unconscionability. Hence the principle is not one of the
disparate status or sophistication.
Towards a More Straightforward Analysis
Identifying unconscionability as a principle has many advan-
tages. It is much easier conceptually to deal with a principle which
has four main parts than seven or ten standards. 74 Also, because
unconscionability is obviously derived from basic contract princi-
ples, its application is consistent with principles of democracy.27 5
Further, facts which call for application of the principle are not
static but dynamic. Unconscionability is not a principle based upon
inequality of bargaining power; rather the existence of disparate
bargaining power, like the parties' status and sophistication, is
merely one objective indication of an abuse transaction. As the
methods of contracting change, the relevant matters of proof of the
principle may also be adapted by the courts. More importantly, the
principle as developed in this article provides a straightforward
method of analyzing transactions to determine whether a contract
is enforceable. It provides not only an analytical framework for de-
ciding, explaining and predicting cases, but also a framework which
allows courts to explain exactly why a contract should, or should
not, be enforced.
Consistent with the theory of freedom of contract, unconsciona-
bility does not impede intelligent, knowing and voluntary risk allo-
cation.7 The ony restraint on such transactions is that of pure
public policy, i.e., the agreement should not harm the general pub-
lic. Where the classic contract does not exist, however, the transac-
272. Fleishman Distilling Corp. v. Distillers Co., 395 F. Supp. 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
273. Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 238 Cal. App. 2d 95, 47 Cal. Rptr 518
(1965).
274. The ten criteria of unconscionability listed in Wille v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
219 Kan. 755, 549 P.2d 903 (1976), would be termed "standards" of unconscionability under
Professor Ellinghaus' approach, as would the seven criteria of whether a forum selection
clause should be enforced as expressed in The Breman v. Zapata Offshore Co., 407 U.S. 1
(1972).
275. Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1057 (1975).
276. See text accompanying notes 217-18 supra.
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tions should be scrutinized more closely because of the dangers of
abuse implicitly present when there is no meaningful negotiation.
This can occur when there is a disparity of bargaining power or when
there is no reasonable opportunity to negotiate risk-shifting terms.
In these potential abuse transactions, risk-shifting clauses are still
upheld if the aggrieved party realized the risk and voluntarily as-
sumed the risk. 77 If the party was excusably ignorant of the risk
or of the contractual risk-allocation, that allocation is ineffective. 278
If the disadvantaged party had no alternative terms available, the
courts look to the commercial setting to determine the reasonable-
ness and enforceability of the term.27 These inquiries bear directly
on the degree to which the transaction reflects the notion of con-
tract. Reduced to its lowest common terms then, application of
unconscionability as a principle depends upon commercial realities
of assent, expectations and need. Defining unconscionability in this
manner explains most judicial decisions and should also permit
reasonable, informed settlement of disputed transactions and the
avoidance of substantial litigation.
The principle permits determination of the scope of lack of choice
as a ground for holding a clause unenforceable, both in terms of the
meaning of the principle and its practical application. In theory,
determining lack of choice is difficult, notwithstanding Professor
Murray's analysis.20 The cases indicate that one's choice is deter-
mined with regard to the availability of alternative terms from the
other party, and elsewhere in the market. If there is no choice, the
commercial reasonableness of the terms is considered, including
general needs of the industry and special needs of the parties.
Courts have held unconscionable terms which a consumer had no
choice but to have in the contract, but have consistently rejected
such a claim when made by a sophisticated individual or company.
This distinction cannot be justified from a standpoint of choice
alone because a sophisticated person can be denied any choice in the
transaction as well as an unsophisticated consumer. However, there
are two factual distinctions which lie in the two types of cases. The
clauses challenged by sophisticated persons have been warranty dis-
claimers, other commercially useful clauses and clauses which are
directly related to the business risks involved. In contrast, ordinary
consumers are more frequently subject to terms which bear no rela-
tion to the risks involved, clauses which are, therefore, commercially
277. E.g., cases cited notes 184-86 supra.
278. See text accompanying notes 95-188 supra.
279. See text accompanying notes 210-17 supra, and cases cited therein.
280. Murray, supra note 2.
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unreasonable. Also, the latter class of cases sometimes involves
items found to be necessities, such as housing, an automobile or
food. Where such items are involved, an unsophisticated or necessi-
tous person may have no opportunity or ability to otherwise protect
himself. A clause which so allocates the legal burdens of these trans-
actions is commercially unreasonable in light of the special needs
of the parties, 8' and such a term should not be enforced. 22
In contrast, a sophisticated individual probably would not have
this sympathy. If the aggrieved person is sophisticated and knows
of the challenged term at the time of contracting, yet has no choice
but to have that term included in the agreement, it arguably ought
to take other steps to protect itself, for instance, the procuring of
insurance. If it is shown that such a person did insure against the
risk, then the real party in interest is the insurer, who voluntarily
assumed the risk by its contract to provide coverage for such a loss.
Or in the language of insurance law, it would not be unconscionable
to enforce the contractual risk-allocation because the aggrieved
party knew of the risk and took measures to protect itself. Therefore,
though the sophisticated person lacked choice, it is not commer-
cially unreasonable to enforce the terms. Thus, the notion that un-
conscionability exists to protect those who cannot reasonably pro-
tect themselves has validity.
The principle of unconscionability accommodates the practical
objections to reliance upon a lack of demonstrated voluntary as-
sumption of risk, i.e., lack of choice. 283 The fact of bargaining over
risk-shifting terms, as well as the specifications of the product or the
underlying transaction itself, almost by definition involves limita-
tion upon the other's options. The inclusion of disclaimers, exculpa-
tory clauses, and other contractual limitations of remedies, can even
be a condition of doing business for many contract-offerors. Such
clauses are rapidly becoming a necessity of economic life for some
manufacturers, one reason being the soaring cost of product liability
insurance. If unconscionability was not intended by the Code drafts-
men to preclude the use of contracts to create legal relationships in
harmony with the facts and needs of commercial life,2"4 these reali-
ties of commercial life must be recognized by the principle. As de-
tailed above, it does. The commercial setting of a contract, includ-
281. See W.L. May Co. v. Philco-Ford Corp., 543 P.2d 283 (Or. 1975).
282. See Weideman v. Tomaselli, 81 Misc. 2d 328, 365 N.Y.S.2d 681 (County Ct. 1975).
283. See Epstein, supra note 88 and Schwartz, supra note 87. But see Leff, Contract as
Thing, AM. U.L. REv. 31 (1970), and Lawful Fraud, supra note 2, for arguments that because
there is no real assent in consumer transactions to permit forms, they ought not be considered
contracts.
284. See U.C.C. § 2-302(2).
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ing the needs of the parties and the industry, is relevant to showing
unconscionablility. Hence, so long as the disadvantaged party
should have known of the contractual risk-allocation, then even in
the absence of choice in the matter, a reasonable term is enforce-
able. 285
The realities of the parties' assent or knowledge of risk allocation
is also recognized by the principle. The requirement that warranty
disclaimers be conspicuous, for example, expressly conditions en-
forceability of those terms upon the likelihood that the person
against whom the term will operate will realize its effect. The basis
of the bargain rationale honors the actual agreement or expectations
of the parties over a wooden judicial interpretation that what is
printed is what was agreed. Likewise, the presence of deceptive sales
techniques or an uneducated purchaser may negate the assumption
that the printed form represents a consensual risk allocation.
The principle of unconscionability also incorporates one of the
most rudimentary purposes of contract: the allocation of attendant
risks and burdens. When a party does not realize or appreciate the
risk transferred by agreement, and is reasonable in not expecting
imposition of that risk upon it, operation of the principle renders
ineffectual a contract purporting to transfer that risk. Therefore,
attempts to circumvent and void one's implied duties or warranties
by contractual language which does not reasonably call to the
other's attention such risk shifting clauses are discouraged.2 86 The
undiscoverable and unbargained for nature of the transferred risk
may cause the contract to be unconscionable. This combination of
knowing assent with attempted risk shifting presents an interesting
theoretical link between contract and tort, particularly in the field
of products liability.2 87
285. Note, however, should be made of the needs and circumstances of the other party.
See text accompanying notes 1-282 supra.
286. Bekkevold v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 216 N.W. 790 (1927), cited in U.C.C. § 2-302 (off.
com.).
287. A comparison of the law of strict liability in tort and contract is beyond the the scope
of this paper. It suffices to note, however, that the necessary ingredients for strict liability
under § 402A of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS essentially parallels the elements of the
principle of unconscionability. That is, the existence of an unreasonably dangerous condition
not discoverable by the consumer (ignorance of the risk) and a product sold in a consumer
transaction (presumed deficiencies in knowledgeable and voluntary risk-allocation). Compare
CHILDRES & JOHNSON, CASES ON EQUITY, REsTrrUTION AND DAMAGES, 304-05 (2d ed. 1974).
The analysis here is not directed, however, to explication of the interface between contract
and tort law, as was that comment. Further, the present analysis concerning the role of
status differs. Professor Childres would have status be a primary, if not conclusive, indica-
tion of an abuse transaction, while the present paper treats it as simply evidence of a lack of
an intelligent, knowing and voluntary risk allocation. See text accompanying notes 264-73
supra.
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The parties' ignorance of the risk is the aspect of the principle
which explains why a contract which, if enforced, would create an
unconscionable result, is unconscionable when made. The Code and
the Second Restatement prohibit the enforcement of contracts or
clauses via the principle of unconscionability only if at the time of
contracting they are unconscionable. An example is the situation
where market price rises dramatically after contracting but before
performance. Such a contract is not unconscionable if at the time
of contracting the price was fair.2 8 However, if the loss subsequent
to contracting arises from a risk that was not recognized as being
transferred by the agreement, then it may be unconscionable. The
distinction is that in the former situation the parties understood
that the price at the time of delivery was fixed, although fluctuation
in market price was inevitable. The seller assumed the risk of a price
rise, while the buyer assumed the risk of a lower price at the time
of performance.
In other situations a risk may not have been appreciated at all.
Even though risk of loss exists whenever a contract is made, it may
or may not have been allocated by the contract. If the risk was not
allocated, the ultimate bearer of the risk is obviously determined by
contract principles and not by the existence of disparate bargaining
power or lack of choice. Consequently, unconscionability is no de-
fense, and the loss would rest upon agreement. The law, in effect,
presumes it is "fair" for that party to bear the risk. It is only the
shifting of a risk that may be unconscionable. For example, if the
resulting loss stemmed from a risk of which the aggrieved party was
reasonably ignorant, the contract may be unconscionable. 89 Hence
the contract was unconscionable when made as to the ultimate loss
arising from the exchange.
Finally, identification of these bases of courts' decisions makes
the prediction of decisions based upon public policy290 or an unfair
exchange rationale easier. 9' If we discount those rules of decisions
which rest upon bargaining deficiencies there is very little left.
Courts appear reluctant to say something is too unfair to be enforce-
able where there has been an intelligent, knowing and voluntary
allocation or risk.
288. E.g., R.L. Kimsey Cotton Co. v. Ferguson, 233 Ga. 962, 214 S.E.2d 360 (1975).
289. As indicated in notes 64 and 96 supra, a party may also be "ignorant" of a risk that
is wholly within the control of another party benefited by a clause which transfers that risk
from the latter to the former. Among the most obvious of these terms are a lease term
exculpating the landlord for its gross negligence or a service contract clause exculpating the
contractor for its negligence.
290. See cases cited notes 45-64, 83-86 supra.
291. See cases cited notes 21-44, 71-76 supra.
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The principle then is a restatement and refinement of the anal-
yses and decision-making processes of courts and legislatures con-
cerning claims that a contract or clause is unconscionable. It is a
vehicle by which future decision-makers, public and private, judges
and attorneys, can evaluate the enforceability of contracts against
a claim of unconscionability.
APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE
The utility of defining unconscionability as a principle lies in the
analysis it provides for predicting what kinds of exchanges will be
enforceable, and those which may not. Application of unconsciona-
bility will first be demonstrated in terms of general contractual
considerations. Second, application will be discussed in specific sit-
uations involving warranty disclaimers and limitation of liability
clauses.
Insulating Contract Terms Via the Bargaining Process: Negotiation,
Notice and Choice
In assessing the enforceability of contract terms a distinction
must be made between negotiated transactions and abuse transac-
tions. The unconscionability rules indicate that if the risks and
burdens of the transactions are negotiated, then the resulting con-
tract will not be unenforceable in whole or in part on grounds of
unconscionability. The reasons for this should be obvious: in a nego-
tiated transaction the risks are intelligently, knowingly and volun-
tarily allocated. Included in this class of exchanges are those which
should have been negotiated since there existed an opportunity to
bargain over the risk-allocation terms of a standard form and the
aggrieved person was sufficiently sophisticated to negotiate. 92 At
the opposite end of the spectrum of contract are the abuse transac-
tions, those which contain one or more of the bases of the uncon-
scionability principle. These contracts are unenforceable because
they fail to meet the classic concept of consensual risk-allocation or
contract. From these distinct types of exchanges we can, via the
principle, extract guidelines to plan for the enforceability of risk-
shifting terms.
Negotiation is one obvious method of preenforcement planning.
Dickering over the terms of an exchange fits the model of contract,
and such bargaining conduct is sufficient to insulate most, if not all,
292. Thus, even if these parties did not specifically foresee and negotiate for a particular
risk of loss, the loss will be allocated by the court pursuant to the usual rules of contract
interpretation and construction.
[Vol. 9
Understanding Unconscionability
of the terms which define and allocate the burdens of an exchange.293
Courts will enforce consensual agreements fairly negotiated by so-
phisticated persons-freedom of contract is not yet dead."9 4 The
obvious justification is that the terms, and the risks affected by
those terms, have been knowingly and voluntarily allocated. This
justification also applies to the insulating factors for non-negotiated
transactions, i.e., notice and choice. Notice includes not only bar-
gaining conduct which reasonably should cause the other party to
realize that the instrument contains terms which transfer a burden
to it, but also contemplates that the other party can appreciate the
nature of the risk sought to be transferred. These interpretations of
notice are in implicit in Professor Llewellyn's basic position that
boilerplate terms are enforceable if not unexpected by the party
against whom they would operate.9 '
Most courts and legislatures now require the notice to be reasona-
ble; that is, the controversial term must be reasonably apparent in
the context of the transaction This proof may take the form of
placing the risk-shifting term itself in conspicuous type on the face
of the contract. 9 Some authorities require the term be displayed in
such a manner before execution of the form agreement that the
complainant should notice it.297 Others require that the contract
contain a conspicuous admonition of the effect of the printed
term,9 ' or the presence of particular words which would make clear
the extent of the risks being disclaimed or transferred.299
The timing of the notice is also important. Obviously a disclaimer
which does not appear until after a bargain has been made cannot
be presumed to be part of the parties' agreement. Other decisions
also suggest that risk-shifting terms must be brought to the atten-
tion of the party against whom they would operate. °" But if those
terms appear in discussions or documents prior to the time of con-
tracting or in prior dealings between the parties, they will be bind-
293. See cases cited notes 102-88 supra, and accompanying text.
294. Accord, Dewey, Freedom of Contract: Is It Still Relevant?, 31 OHIO ST. L.J. 724
(1970).
295. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 H.Av. L. REv. 700 (1939).
296. In turn, whether a notice is conspicuous may depend upon a flexible standard of
reasonableness or a mechanical determination whether the type is of a minimum size.
Compare, e.g., U.C.C. §1-201(10) with ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, § 262B (1977) and 16 C.F.R.
§ 433 (1977) which require a notice to be in 10 point type.
297. Hunt v. Perkins Mach. Co., 353 Mass. 535, 226 N.E.2d 228 (1967).
298. Personal Fin. Co. v. Meredith, 39 Ill. App. 3d 695, 350 N.E.2d 781 (1976); ILL. REv.
STAT. ch. 121 V2, § 262D (1977).
299. Auto-Teria, Inc. v. Ahern, 352 N.E.2d 774 (Ind. App. Ct. 1976). The holding in that
case was that language in cover letter that "there is no magic" in the product did not
effectively disclaim implied warranties of merchantability and fitness.
300. E.g., cases cited notes 167 & 171-72 supra.
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ing because the aggrieved party should have realized that the other
would include such a term in the present contract and objected. 30 ,
Proof that the aggrieved party was reasonably informed (either be-
cause of its own experience or because of the form-offerors efforts)
hence is necessary to assure the enforceability of standardized
forms. This adds further pressure upon contracting parties to set up
methods within its organizational structure to minimize the risk
that a form contract will not be enforced. This might be afforded
via revised merchandising techniques or other risk-management
measures.
3 02
The third insulating factor, choice, is a difficult matter to prove
or disprove. One's choice is necessarily limited by the extent of one's
needs, and one's needs are the very motive for contracting for an
exchange to fulfill those needs. Further, the defense of duress is of
little practical use since the "gun-at-the-head" situation is rela-
tively rare, or at least rarely litigated. Hence, the classic proof of
duress is usually unavailable or inapplicable. Moreover, the notion
of economic duress, rather than physical duress, can conflict with
the economic realities of the impetus for contracting. 03 Thus, in
answering the question of what is an impermissible limitation upon
another's free will in contracting,304 the courts return to the substan-
tive question of whether the challenged term is commercially rea-
sonable. In turn, commercial reasonableness is identified in terms
of the parties' needs and the market's needs °.3  This makes sense in
light of the Code's policy to encourage commercial reasonableness.
Some lack of choice is avoidable, yet if a party lacks a reasonable
choice, it is still entitled to reasonable terms.
301. This presumes an ability to understand and notice the terms in the earlier transac-
tion and an opportunity and ability to bargain.
302. This risk of loss appears to be of a random nature-the chance that a given person
with whom one contracts would not be sophisticated enough to be held to the written agree-
ment-and hence suitable for actuarial treatment to spread that risk among other transac-
tions.
303. See generally, Epstein, supra note 78.
304. Professor Slawson identifies the legitimate use of bargaining power as determinative
of the question of whether one has permissibly limited, or eliminated, the other's choice via
a standardized form. See Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of
Lawmaking Power, 84 HARv. L. REV. 529, 551 (1971). The question seems to be answered by
the Court in The Elfrida, 172 U.S. 186 (1898), where it discusses American and English
decisions dealing with the enforceability of ship salvage contracts. The Court found a distinc-
tion "between contracts corruptly, fraudulently, compulsorily or under a clear mistake of
facts and such as merely involve a bad bargain or are accompanied with a greater or less
amount of labor difficulty or danger than was originally expected." Id. at 195. These circum-
stances were also apparently equated with circumstances which would make enforcement
"contrary to equity and good conscience." Id. at 192.
305. Kohlenberger, Inc. v. Tyson's Foods, Inc., 510 S.W.2d 555 (Ark. 1974); W.L. May
Co. v. Philco-Ford Corp., 543 P.2d 283 (Or. 1975).
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The reasonableness of the parties' needs depends initially upon
the ability of the aggrieved party to protect itself. This self-
protection is essentially a question of that party's ability to manage
its risk exposure, which can be done in a variety of ways. The pres-
ence of these abilities appears in the persons whose unconsciona-
bility claims on grounds of lack of choice were denied by the courts.
These persons' status suggests an ability to avoid the risk involved
by passing the cost of exposure on to others. Alternatively, such a
party may be able to control or eliminate its risk by securing insur-
ance or by its methods of handling the product.306 Quite obviously
if the aggrieved party had no such ability, the other's needs should
not be determinative.
The reasonableness of the controversial term should be the lone
inquiry only if there is no alternative seller (or buyer) in the market.
The existence of these alternatives, or the lack thereof, once again
depends on the aggrieved person's sophistication and ability to seek
the same exchange elsewhere. To a consumer who makes a decision
to buy based upon non-contractual considerations such as model,
style and color of the goods, and who is ignorant of the potential of
different terms elsewhere (assuming she or he could understand the
difference) there may reasonably be no alternative seller. Con-
versely, a more sophisticated person could appreciate and realize
the possibilities of different terms, and hence should be held to what
others were offering in determining his or her choice. 07 If other deal-
ers should have been considered, and no alternatives were available
elsewhere, the question returns to the commercial reasonableness of
the term, not only for the parties but also for the industry generally.
While there is ample room to justify a term for which the ag-
grieved party had no choice, the threat of the term being uncon-
scionable can be removed by the offering of a reasonable choice by
the form offeror. For example, price x may be the selling price where
all implied warranties are disclaimed, and price x+y being applica-
ble for implied warranty protection (where y is a reasonable incre-
ment for this protection and inconvenience to the seller). An elec-
tion by the buyer, which is assumed here to be knowledgeable as
306. Compare Posttape Assoc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 537 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1976) with
Sarfati v. M.A. Hittman & Sons, Inc., 35 App. Div. 2d 1004, 318 N.Y.S.2d 352 (1970), aff'd,
30 N.Y.2d 613, 331 N.Y.S.2d 40, 282 N.E.2d 126 (1972). And if the real party in interest is
an insurer, the courts have consistently rejected a claim of unconscionability, sometimes
stating that the insurer knowingly assumed the contractual risk. See, Royal Indem. Co. v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 385 F. Supp. 572 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Abel Holding Co. v. Am. Dist.
Tel. Co., 138 N.J. Super. 137, 350 A.2d 843 (Sup. Ct. Law Div. 1974).
307. Thus, there appears a different standard for "knaves" and "fools," respectively.
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to the risk assumed, to buy at price x might defeat a claim of
unconscionability.
The presence tien of negotiation or notice and choice, as dis-
cussed, insulates practically all substantive terms of exchange from
the unconscionability defense. This should enable people who want
to ensure the enforceability of the terms to do so. The lack of these
efforts, however, may subject the offeror to the vicissitudes of ad hoc
adjudication, the outcome of which will probably rest upon the
status of the other party. In other words, the position of the form-
offeror is becoming like that of the tortfeasor in that the contractual
remedies and rights of the offeror are becoming dependent upon the
deficiencies of other party, e.g., the "egg-shell headed" plaintiff of
tort law fame.Y5 Thus, the importance of this definition of the prin-
ciple is that it may serve to increase the predictability of contract
enforceability, yet it does not sacrifice flexibility in the application
of the principle to new modes of contracting.
Interpreting Disclaimers and Remedy Limitation Clauses
1. Warranty Disclaimers
A clause which disclaims the implied warranty of fitness under
the Code must meet specific criteria to be enforceable.' 9 The lan-
guage used must be specific and such that a reasonable person
would notice it. Thus, section 2-316 includes concrete rules for de-
termining the enforceability of disclaimers which are similar to two
of the situations indicating an unconscionable clause: ignorance of
the contract and risk.
Compliance with the rules embodied in section 2-316 does not
remove all grounds for these terms being unconscionable. For exam-
ple, the method of contracting may negate the conspicuousness of
the disclaimers which appear on the contract document or the per-
son against whom the clause would operate might not have had the
opportunity to see the full contract or the disclaimer language. Also,
compliance with these rules will not preclude the defense that the
aggrieved person lacked a choice. And while some decisions, without
analysis, conclude that because warranty disclaimers are permitted
by the Code they are perforce not unreasonable, the terms can be
commercially unreasonable in a particular transaction. If the ag-
grieved party has no ability to protect itself, the transaction may be
308. ,The concept of avoidable fault has also recently been suggested as a tool for analysis
under § 2-719(2) of the Code dealing with clauses which fail their essential purpose (a rule
which is part of the principle of unconscionability). See Limited Remedies, supra note 2 at
52-56.
309. U.C.C. § 2-316.
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commercially unreasonable. The rationale, as also seen in other
contexts, is that the transaction would no longer be for the benefit
of both persons, but would be a contractual exchange by which the
aggrieved party's rights are unilaterally removed.
2. Limitation of Liability Clauses
Although clauses which limit one party's remedies may seem less
harsh than warranty disclaimers, in practice there may be little
difference. These clauses have greater potential for deception since
they may appear to give adequate protection while resulting in no
real remedy. Thus, section 2-719 prohibits terms which provide an
"illusory remedy."
That section further provides that a limitation of remedy clause
in consumer goods transactions is "prima facie" unconscionable
where it would limit damages for personal injury. That presumption
does not apply where commercial loss is involved. Yet no court has
explained why such a limitation of remedy clause is so onerous in
the consumer context or decided that such a term is valid in a
consumer goods-personal injury litigation, or invalid in a commer-
cial exchange-loss situation. 10 However, by applying the uncon-
scionability principle one can explain the probable reason for this
disparate presumption and suggest when it might be rebutted or
when economic loss cannot be so limited.
Section 2-719(2) contains some recognition of the dangers of limi-
tation terms. The dangers are that the aggrieved party may have
been ignorant of the risk assumed, or it might reasonably have
expected that the remedy provided would protect it in the event of
a malfunction eventually ending in default.
Despite such disclaimer and limitation clauses, there are always
basic rights to which contracting parties are entitled, in the absence
of a showing that the aggrieved party knowingly, voluntarily and
intelligently waived or contracted away those rights. Among those
rights are the implied warranties of fitness and merchantability in
the Code."' There are also presumptions of a fair and beneficial
310. See Note, Presumption of Unconscionability and Nondefective Products Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 148 (1975). In Collins v. Uniroyal, 64 N.J. 260,
315 A.2d 16 (1974), (upon which the above Note commented) the court essentially held that
the presumption of unconscionability was not overcome by the existence in the contract of
an express warranty which arguably provided more protection than that required by the Code
in the implied warranties of fitness and merchantability. Thus the presumption apparently
is not overcome by evidence that the contract as a whole was more "fair" than required by
the Code, which would indicate that the unconscionableness of a limitation clause must be
rebutted by evidence concerning the bargaining process: negotiation, notice (of risk and
terms) and choice.
311. Apparently, less proof is necessary to show a knowing and intelligent assumption of
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exchange, indicated by those decisions first discussed under the
rules of unconscionability above. In addition, the presumption in
section 2-719 that a clause limiting damages for personal injuries
stemming from a consumer goods transaction is unconscionable
appears directly related to the policy of tort law to protect individu-
als against the drastic losses which can result from those injuries."2
These considerations, together with the recognition that consumer
transactions may be particularly subject to abuse and lack of bar-
gaining, most probably led to the presumption in 2-719(3)2'1
These rights, however, can be bargained away. Neither the Code
nor the courts have indicated that damages arising from personal
injuries caused by consumer goods can never be limited. Evidence
of a knowledgeable and intelligent risk allocation and a choice on
the part of the consumer could rebut the presumption. This may
indeed be a very heavy burden of proof. But the presumption is
rebuttable. Conversely, commercial losses may be unconscionable
even without the aid of a presumption. For those losses it may be
necessary to show a reasonable lack of knowledge and choice, as the
courts do not presume those facts in light of a written agreement .3 1
Nevertheless, the principle is applicable and indicates that these
losses too may be held unconscionable.315
the risk where a commercial entity is involved than where a consumer is involved. E.g., Gates
Rubber Co. v. U.S.M. Corp. 508 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1975). See also text accompanying note
165 supra. See cases cited notes 21-94 supra, and accompanying text; U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-315.
312. E.g., Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P. 2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr 17 (1965);
Alfred N. Kaplan & Co. v. Chrysler Corp. 49 Ill. App. 3d 194, 364 N.E.2d 100 (1977). These
decisions held that the doctrine of strict liability in tort did not cover purely economic losses
from malfunctioning equipment. The courts characterized those losses as being suited to a
remedy based on the law of contracts and the parties' expectations. Whether or not such a
distinction should be drawn is debatable. E.g., Santo v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J.
52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965). But that debate does not detract from the presumption of unenforcea-
bility of limitation clauses as applied to personal injuries from consumer goods.
313. Besides § 2-719(3), U.C.C. § 9-206(1) (dealing with the negotiability of contracts
which contain an express or implied waiver clause) permits the individual state to set its own
standards for such instruments in consumer transactions.
314. Although a clause or contract may be found unconscionable.in a commercial setting,
less proof is generally needed to show that a commercial entity, or other person of personal
or apparent sophistication, knowingly and intelligently assumed a risk than is needed to show
the same by a consumer. E.g., Gates Rubber Co. v. U.S.M. Corp., 508 F.2d 603 (7th Cir.
1975). See also text accompanying note 165 supra.
315. This interpretation does not cause § 2-719(a) to be redundant. That subsection
makes clear that the parties may establish their own remedies by "agreement," which is
defined as the bargain in fact of the parties. U.C.C. § 1-201(4). But unconscionability applies
only to "contracts," which are defined as the total legal obligation based upon an agreement
(other than unconscionability). U.C.C. §§ 2-302(1), 1-201(11). Thus even though the identifi-
cation of unconscionable clauses may require that courts go beyond the written terms in order
to ascertain the parties' agreement, e.g., Personal Fin. Corp. v. Meredith, 39 Ill. App. 3d 695,
350 N.E.2d 781 (1976), it operates at a wholly different level than determining what agree-
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CONCLUSION
Unconscionability in contract law is essentially a principle based
upon bargaining. It does not give courts a license to restructure the
terms of a disputed exchange as they might deem appropriate, but
it does protect against the deprivation of basic statutory and com-
mon law rights in an exchange. These rights include the presump-
tion that merchants provide certain warranties in the goods they
sell, that liquidated damages clauses must be reasonable, that peo-
ple must have an opportunity to be heard (unless there is an overrid-
ing governmental interest) before losing goods in which they have
an interest, and the rules on recovery of damages where goods fail
to meet the parties' expectations. The principle of unconscionability
also requires that where precedent or statute does not provide for
the allocation of risk, the exchange should be fair. Yet these rights
can be waived and the burdens re-allocated by knowing, intelligent
and voluntary action. The principle then requires either fairness
and reasonableness or a proper assumption of risk (negotiation or
notice and choice). The inverse of this proposition is the statement
of the principle in the Official Comments to UCC 2-302: the preven-
tion of oppression and unfair surprise.
This principle is not a panacea for all that ails modern contract
law. Mass-produced and standardized contracts inevitably produce
exchanges which really are no contracts-i.e. consensual risk-
allocations-but which nevertheless may be observed by the parties
or enforced by the courts because of a lack of a showing of uncon-
scionableness. But if the solution must depend upon policies and
goals, rather than on extant principles, the judiciary is not the ap-
propriate branch of government to make those adjustments. Courts
should adhere to the principles established by statute and preced-
ent.31
6
This the courts have done in the decisions here reviewed. The
language in those decisions which sounds as if the courts are approv-
ing only what they think is an equal or fair exchange is irrelevant,
because those and other decisions demonstrate the significance of
bargaining to insulate risk-shifting terms. Thus unconscionability is
a democratic principle,3 7 and a proper development in the tradition
of the common law.
ment or understanding exists in fact. Unconscionability determines what contract terms are
enforceable, while the rest of the body of contract principles determines whether the parties'
agreement constitutes a legal obligation in the first instance. See also text accompanying
notes 249-50 supra.
316. SeeDworkin, Hard Cases, supra note 13.
317. Cf. Id.
1978]
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The language of the decisions generally does not admit of the
definitional precision advocated in this article. Rather, courts have
chosen to use mor conventional labels of contract avoidance when
in fact they were employing an unconscionability analysis. Those
courts would further the development of the principle by expressly
acknowledging the principle as the tool of analysis they are follow-
ing. All parties involved would benefit from this final abandonment
of "covert tools."3 ' Not only will the risk of having a clause declared
unconscionable be more predictable, litigants would also be less
likely to gamble on evoking judicial sympathy to extract themselves
from a bargain which they knowingly entered, but which later
soured.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the principle represents
a further departure of contract law from the rules established under
the so-called objective theory of contract. Courts increasingly look
to the agreement-in-fact of the parties, rather than formbook lan-
guage. This does not necessarily detract from the importance of
objective facts to ascertainment of the contract, but the rules of
proof are changing. The courts examine the commercial practices
involved, and the status of each litigant in assessing the issue of
whether damages rules have been intelligently, knowingly and vol-
untarily altered.
The methods of business and merchandising, and hence contract-
ing, have changed dramatically over the past decades. This growth
has put great pressure on traditional principles of contract avoid-
ance, and they have been found wanting. For better or worse, the
principle of unconscionability has been a large portion of the judi-
cial and legislative response.
318. Professor Llewellyn stated that "covert tools are never reliable tools," meaning that
judicial "tools" of analysis which do not admit or recognize the thoughts that are actually at
work behind a decision are inherently unreliable. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARv. L. REV.
700 (1939).
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